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Tiivistelmä: 
Tekijänoikeuden saralla on viime vuosina käyty mittavaa keskustelua siitä, voiko 
esimerkiksi tekoälysovellus olla tekijä ja millä tavalla koneellista kontribuutiota tulisi 
tekijänoikeudessa ylipäänsä arvioida. Keskustelu ei ole rajoittunut vain tekijänoikeuteen, 
vaan erityisesti nk. posthumanistisen teoriasuuntauksen piirissä on jo jonkin aikaa 
pohdittu ihmisen suhdetta ei-inhimilliseen. Eräs molempia keskusteluja tietyssä mielessä 
yhdistävä kysymys on ollut se, ovatko ihmisten ja koneiden rajat muuttuneet 
epäselvemmiksi tai ovatko ne aina olleet sitä? 
Tässä tutkielmassa ei tarkastellakaan kysymystä siitä, kuka tai mikä voi olla tekijä 
vaan posthumanistisen teorian hengessä sitä, mikä on ihmisen merkitys tekijänoikeuden 
järjestelmässä ja erityisesti suhteessa teknologiaan. Kysymystä lähestytään Euroopan 
Unionin tuomioistuimen omaperäisyyden arviointia koskevan oikeuskäytännön kautta. 
Tutkielman menetelmällinen kehys koostuu Antti Hautamäen tulkinnan mukaisesta 
näkökulmarelativismista sekä Samuli Hurrin väitöskirjassaan esittelemästä 
oikeuskäytännön teoriasta. Tutkielmassa esitetään oikeustapausaineistolle 
posthumanistisen teorian innoittamana kolme kysymystä eri perspektiiveistä, ja näihin 
kysymyksiin etsitään vastauksia oikeustapausten lähiluvun keinoin. 
Tutkielmasta ilmenee, ettei kysymys ihmisyyden ja teknologian välisistä rajoista 
ole tekijänoikeudenkaan saralla itsestään selvä. Rajojen muodostuminen ihmisyyden ja 
teknologian välillä ei ollut yhtä suoraviivaista, kuin tutkielman alussa esitetty hypoteesi 
rajojen liukumisesta oletti. Näiden rajanvetojen merkitys vaikutti olevan ennen kaikkea 
jonkin vieraan ulossulkeminen, joka tapauksissa näyttäytyi paitsi teknologiana, myös 
ihmiseen itseensä kuuluvana vierautena, alitajuisena aistimellisuutena. Nämä toiseuden 
elementit ulossulkemalla jäljelle jäi tekijänoikeusteorian perinteinen hahmo, luova 
ihmisyksilö. Tutkielman viimeiseksi kysymykseksi ja lopputulemaksi jääkin, ovatko 
nämä vieraana ulossuljetut elementit todella vieraita vai sittenkin olennainen osa meitä? 
Ja jos se mitä pidämme ihmisyydelle vieraana kuuluu siihen sittenkin, miten meidän 
pitäisi oma ihmisyytemme ymmärtää? 
 
Avainsanat: immateriaalioikeudet, tekijänoikeus, omaperäisyys, oikeusteoria, 
oikeusfilosofia, posthumanismi 
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Summary: 
In recent years, there has been extensive discussion in the field of copyright as to whether, 
for example, an artificial intelligence application can be an author and how machine 
contribution should be evaluated in the first place. The debate has not been limited to 
copyright, but especially in the context of the so-called posthumanist theory the 
relationship between human and non-human has been discussed for some time. One 
question that unites these two discussions has been whether the boundaries between 
humans and machines have become somehow fluid or whether they have always been 
that way.  
Thesis does not address the question of who or what may be the author, but rather, 
drawing from posthumanist theory, what is the meaning of humanity in the copyright 
system and in relation to technology. The issue is approached through the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and its assessment of originality criterion in 
copyright cases. The methodological framework of the thesis consists of Antti 
Hautamäki’s interpretation of perspective relativism and the theory of legal practice 
introduced by Samuli Hurri in his dissertation. Three questions inspired by posthumanist 
theory are posed to the case material, each from different perspective. Answers to these 
questions are looked via close reading of the cases. 
Thesis shows that the question of the boundaries between humanity and technology 
is not self-evident even in the field of copyright. Firstly, the formation of boundaries 
between humanity and technology was not as straightforward as the hypothesis presented 
at the beginning implied. The significance of these boundaries seemed to be above all the 
exclusion of the ‘otherness’, which appeared not only as technology, but also as a human 
being's own, subconscious sensuality. By excluding these alien elements, the traditional 
figure of copyright theory, the creative individual, emerged. As the final question and 
conclusion of the thesis remains, are these alienated, excluded elements really alien or 
rather an essential part of us? And if what we consider to be foreign to humanity is after 
all included in it, how should we understand our own humanity? 
 
Keywords: intellectual property rights, copyright, originality, legal theory, legal 
philosophy, posthumanism 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Copyright law has always been centred on the concept of human as only humans have 
been considered to possess features such as creativity. But what does it mean to be human 
in copyright today? Has this question become more difficult to answer? Certain events 
that have recently taken place might suggest so. In 2016 a project called ”Next 
Rembrandt” programmed an artificial intelligence (AI) application to create novel 
paintings in the style of the Dutch master, which were then 3D printed.1 The outcome has 
been evaluated to have an uncanny resemblance to the actual work of Rembrandt. 
Previously in 2015 Japanese engineers taught a robot the art of a master swordsman. At 
the end of experiment, the robot was considered to perform better than the samurai.2 
Recently Helsingin Sanomat told about David Cope, who wanted to teach computer to 
compose music. First he decided to find out, what does individual composing style consist 
of.3 
These events among many others have sparked discussion in the field of copyright 
law: how should the works carried out by non-humans be assessed? So far, courts have 
not needed to take much stand on this complex matter. One potential example emerged, 
though, in the United States when People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 
sued photographer Christian Slater, contesting his copyright to a photo taken by a 
monkey, the photo being the monkey’s selfie.4 The case was finally brought to a 
conclusion in the spring 2018 when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower 
                                                 
1 ‘Computer paints 'new Rembrandt' after old works analysis’. BBC 6.5.2016. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35977315. Last visited 27.8.2019. 
2 ‘Sword-wielding robot beats Japanese master samurai’. UPI 7.6.2015. Available at: 
https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2015/06/07/Sword-wielding-robot-beats-Japanese-master-
samurai/2991433692865/. Last visited: 27.8.2019. 
3 ’Sibelius vai Homo Deus?’ Helsingin Sanomat 28.4.2019. Available at: https://www.hs.fi/kulttuuri/art-
2000006082466.html. Last visited 27.8.2019. 
4 ’The monkey selfie lawsuit lives’. The Verge Apr 13 2018. Available at: 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/13/17235486/monkey-selfie-lawsuit-ninth-circuit-motion-to-dismiss-
denied. Last visited: 27.8.2019. 
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court’s decision, ruling that only humans can pursue copyright infringement claims.5 In 
Europe, the outcome would have most likely been the same.6  
When computer is ‘better’ than human in calculation, it usually does not cause an 
uproar or a media sensation. But if computers appear to be more creative than humans, it 
is a strange situation. Only humans can be creative. When we talk about these creative 
machines, we often end up talking about what is creativity and what is human, what 
creativity consists of. 
Currently there remains a strong consensus on the level of European legislation as 
well as international treaties that natural person is the one who authors the work.7 On the 
international level, especially relevant to European copyright law is the Berne 
Convention, at least in terms of authorship discussion. Although the term ‘author’ is often 
mentioned and used in the text of the Convention, it is not explicitly defined.8 However, 
the author is strongly implied to be a natural human person. This interpretation is derived 
from for example the Berne provisions stating that the term of protection is to be counted 
from the death of author.9 On the level of EU law, several provisions point to the same 
direction. For example, Article 2(1) of the Computer Program Directive10 states that ‘the 
author of a computer program shall be the natural person or group of natural persons who 
has created the program or […] the legal person designated as the right holder by that 
                                                 
5’Monkey does not own selfie copyright, appeals court rules’ CNN 24.4.2018. Available at: 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/24/us/monkey-selfie-peta-appeal/index.html. Last visited 27.8.2019. 
6 Andreas Guadamuz, ‘Can the monkey selfie case teach us anything about copyright law?’ WIPO 
Magazine 1/2018. Available at: https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2018/01/article_0007.html. Last 
visited 27.8.2019. 
7 The issue has been taken upon by many accounts during past couple of years, see e.g. Sam Ricketson, 
The need for human authorship - Australian developments: Telstra Corp Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty 
Ltd. E.I.P.R. 34(1) 2012, p.54-60.; Paul Lambert, Computer-generated works and copyright: selfies, traps, 
robots, AI and machine learning. E.I.P.R. 39(1) 2017, p.12-20.; Julia Dickenson – Alex Morgan –Birgit 
Clark, Creative machines: ownership of copyright in content created by artificial intelligence applications. 
E.I.P.R. 39(8) 2017, p.457-460.; Jane C. Ginsburg, People not machines: authorship and what it means in 
the Berne Convention. IIC 49(2) 2018, p.131–135. 
8 Rosa Ballardini – Kan He – Teemu Roos, AI-Generated Content: Authorship and Inventorship in the 
Age of Artificial Intelligence in Taina Pihlajarinne - Juha Vesala - Olli Honkkila (ed.) Online Distribution 
of Content in the EU. Edward Elgar 2019, p.121. 
9 Article 7(1) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on 
September 28, 1979). 
10 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs. OJ L 111, 5.5.2009, p. 16–22. 
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legislation’. The clause seems to say that the author must be a human being.11 Several 
other directives imply the same premise.12  
The issue has been widely discussed in academic literature as well. As Dickenson, 
Morgan and Clark argue in EU law context: ‘the EU test for subsistence of copyright as 
set out in the CJEU’s Infopaq decision focuses on whether the work is the author’s own 
intellectual creation. This test thus clearly envisages an author being a human person, and 
is generally interpreted as such.’13 Also Jane C Ginsburg recently discussed the issue, 
recalling the article by Sam Ricketson already from 1992 titled ‘People or Machines: The 
Berne Convention and the Changing Concept of Authorship’.14 While Professor 
Ricketson acknowledged that the Berne Convention did not define authorship, it was 
likely because such specification in terms of whether author is human would have been 
unnecessary. According to Professor Ricketson, the idea of human authorship laid in the 
background of most of the articles of the Convention.15  
If we accept that copyright system indeed is heavily based on humanity, we might 
want to ask, where does this assumption come from? While keeping in mind that 
inventions such as Artificial Intelligence only gained momentum fairly recently (and thus 
consideration of such issues was not necessary before) foundation for human based 
copyright can be found from the so-called justification theories and the central position 
author has in them. As Ginsburg notes, copyright system is built on two pillars: on the 
natural rights of the author and personal creativity, and on the other hand, on incentives 
to create for the general benefit of society.16 These two branches form the justification 
theory of copyright. The former, known as the personality theory, is usually associated 
with Kant and Hegel, while the latter, the utilitarian theory, is linked to Locke.17 In terms 
                                                 
11 Ballardini – He – Roos (2019), p.122. 
12 Ballardini – He – Roos (2019), p.123: Such as Article 4(1) Directive 96/9/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases. OJ L 77, 27.3.1996, 
p. 20–28 (Database Directive), Article 2(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to 
copyright in the field of intellectual property. 
OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 28–35 (Rental and Lending Rights Directive) and Article 1(5) of the Council 
Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and 
rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (the Satellite 
Broadcasting Directive). 
13 Dickenson - Morgan - Clark (2017), p.459. 
14 Ginsburg (2018). 
15 Ginsburg (2018), p.131. 
16 Ginsburg (2018), p.132. 
17 Ballardini – He – Roos (2019), p.119. 
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of intellectual property rights, Hegel and Locke have been viewed especially as theorists 
of property and providing justifications for ownership. According to Locke, the 
intellectual labour of the author mixed with other resources justifies the author’s right 
over the fruit of his/her labours.18 The personality theory by Hegel claims that a work 
belongs to or reflects the personality of creator.19 
However, this study does not take up the matter of authorship. Instead of asking 
who the author is, the question is what kind of humans emerge from the copyright system. 
In terms of philosophy, this question is not a new one. Some could argue that indeed a 
significant part of Western philosophy is centred on question of ‘who are we as humans?’ 
In this study, the aim is to approach this question via philosophical framework inspired 
by posthumanist theories. This could be considered as certain kind of contraposition for 
Hegelian justification theory. While personality theory emphasizes the features associated 
with authorship such as creativity and originality as something fundamentally human, 
posthumanist theories have questioned the centric position of human altogether.  
Despite its philosopical underpinnings, this work is not about the theory of some 
great writers (such as Hegel). Instead, it is about the ‘theory of practice’, that is, theory 
as the problématique that stands behind and generates the material reality of practice, that 
is, in the context of this work, in the reality of legal cases. Having said that, by reading 
the cases through posthumanist theories it might be possible to illuminate aspects of them 
that have been observed less. This way the study hopes to address the question of what 
are the features of human that are constructed in the praxis of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). This examination is carried out via case analysis of the CJEU’s 
landmark cases regarding originality. The specific sense in which this work may be called 
deconstruction of the human figure in copyright is that it does not presume, or aim to 
establish, analytical clarity or normative coherence in the copyright system, but on the 
contrary reveals that the human of copyright is neither clear nor inevitable. Hopefully, 
this re-reading of these famous cases could contribute to future discussions in the field of 
copyright and technology and perhaps shed light to the place of humanity in the current 
system.  
                                                 
18 John Locke - Richard H. Cox, Second Treatise of Government. Wiley 2014, p.18. 
19 Ballardini – He - Roos (2019), p.119.  
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1.2 Research questions 
Human individual has been considered a central character in European copyright law. As 
discussed above, this is visible both in theoretical justification of copyright and in 
international treaties and legislation. However, it seemed that ‘human’ was not really 
discussed in the copyright cases of the CJEU. This observation formed into a problem 
that eventually became the research question of this study: what is human in copyright? 
However, before that the work underwent several preliminary phases.  
The study draws inspiration from posthumanist theories, where one of the central 
questions has been what distinguishes humans from other forms of life. What kind of line 
exists between human and a robot for example, if any? This work was started with a 
working hypothesis: could it be that borders of human have become somehow more 
difficult to locate and are they being pushed forward so that elements of non-human are 
being included? In other words, have humans become closer to machines? To start 
answering this question I collected case material from the CJEU. On this first round, I 
looked for cases that related to interpretation of InfoSoc Directive20 and which were 
delivered during years 2009-2019. The selection of this criteria was based on the 
hypothesis that the case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades 
Forening,21 which brought along many new elements to the Court’s interpretation of 
copyright law, might have served as a landmark for copyright posthumanism as well. 
Therefore, I limited the search to cases delivered after Infopaq. The search criteria 
produced a material of 35 cases that I started to go through.  
However, I did not find what I was looking for. Instead, the material appeared to 
imply other issues. First, if we were to assume that the question of my working hypothesis 
would imply an onward movement, i.e. humans moving closer to machines, this 
movement rather seemed backwards. Whenever cases discussed humans, it did not seem 
that humans were becoming more of something. Rather, it seemed humans were 
becoming less. Whenever machines and humans appeared together, the dynamic appeared 
much more complex than I initially thought. So I changed the hypothesis: what kind of 
relationship there actually was between humans and machines?  
                                                 
20 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. OJ L 167, 
22.6.2001, p. 10–19. 
21 C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, ECLI:EU:C:2009:465. 
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Eventually I chose 11 cases for further analysis that seemed to respond to these 
questions, addressing issues of technology and humanity. Closer look at these cases shed 
again more light to both praxis of the CJEU in formulation of human subject and the 
research question of this study. Although at first look it had seemed that ‘human’ was 
almost entirely missing from the case material, now it started to look like human was 
being discussed after all. This discussion was especially visible in cases that related to 
criterion of ‘originality’. Originality is the so-called threshold for copyright protection to 
be granted.22 Work must be original in a sense that it is its author’s own intellectual 
creation, as affirmed in the Infopaq decision. It was precisely originality that seemed to 
be closely related to the idea that only humans can be authors, the most significant 
subjects of copyright system.23 Originality seemed to be synonymic for creativity. If we 
assume that only humans can be creative, then the concept of originality appeared to 
provide a valuable insight into this fundamental feature of humanity. 
Therefore, I eventually chose six originality cases for final examination, which are 
also landmark cases of the CJEU in terms of originality. This affected the final choice. 
As my hypothesis had again specified and I had started to think that it was precisely 
originality that might lead me to the fundamental question of ‘what is human’, I thought 
it reasonable to address the originality discourse in whole. Indeed, it has been considered 
that in this line of cases the CJEU de facto created European level criterion for 
originality.24 Therefore, cases Infopaq, FAPL25, Painer26, Football Dataco27 and SAS28 
not only present the CJEU’s interpretation of originality but also the process through 
which it came into existence. By choosing these cases, I could observe not only the 
concept of humanity in the praxis the CJEU but also its development. One case is newer: 
Levola Hengelo29, which serves as a sort of an epilogue to the originality saga. In fact, 
Levola Hengelo is the most recent copyright case from the CJEU by the time of writing 
                                                 
22 Eleonora Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright – Full Harmonization through Case Law. Edward Elgar 
2013, p.59. 
23 Ballardini – He – Roos (2019), p.119. 
24 Rosati (2013), p.99-100. 
25 C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and C-429/08 
Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2011:631.. 
26 C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:798.. 
27 C-604/10 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Yahoo! UK Ltd and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:115. 
28 C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2012:259. 
29 C‑310/17 Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:618.. 
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this thesis. It was delivered 17 years after the last landmark case of originality. Yet, it still 
seems to express the same observations made from the previous originality cases. 
The essential question of this study is how in practice the CJEU formulates 
representation of human in copyright cases. In other words, what is humanity in copyright 
system? This question is approached via three sub-questions, inspired by posthumanist 
theory and elements that emerged from case material. Firstly, the study asks, if the 
fundamental human feature is creativity, then what it means to act that way? And if 
creativity is central for humanity, could automation be regarded its counterpart? 
Furthermore, who is described as creative and who is described mechanic? Secondly, 
often discussed in posthumanist theory is the idea that borders between humans and 
machines are becoming increasingly fluid or that they merge. Therefore, the second part 
asks, whether these categories of human and machine are fluid or stable? Do categories 
of human and machine intertwine or are they separate? If such separation between them 
exists, how is that division mediated? Thirdly, the other central human feature alongside 
creativity is discussed: rationality. If counterpart for creativity is found from automation 
and counterpart for humanity in general is found from technology, this section contrasts 
against each other rationality and that which escapes rationalization: sensuous.  
In this manner, three questions are asked from the research material. What is 
creativity in comparison to automation, what is the relationship between humanity and 
technology and what is the meaning of rationality when compared to sensuous. These 
three questions are operated via conceptual pairs of creativity/automation, 
humanity/technology and rationality/sensuous. These also represent three divisions. First 
division is explored within humanity. The second division takes place between realms of 
humanity and technology. Finally, the third division takes place within the subject. Via 
these questions and divisions, hopefully an image of ‘human’ starts to appear. 
Finally a few words about limitations of the study. Two issues that would have been 
especially relevant are the economic factors of the cases as well as the issue of balancing 
interests30, both strongly appearing in cases. Regarding the former, human creativity 
appeared in many cases to be negotiated in economic context. As for the latter, creativity, 
technology and economic aspects sometimes appeared as contradictory to each other. It 
                                                 
30 See e.g. Jonas Christoffersen, Human rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in 
Christopher Geiger (ed.), Research Handbook of Human Rights and Intellectual Property. Edward Elgar 
2015, p.19-39. 
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seemed that the role law has in all this is exactly that: balancing those dynamics. Besides 
these, it is clear that legal system is very much centred on human subjects. Therefore, it 
would be possible to inspect the places of human in many other contexts as well. Some 
questions for further research might be for example the distinction between copyright and 
industrial rights systems. What kind of representation is produced for instance of inventor 
in patent law? Similarly, the question of human dignity would be most relevant in this 
sense. But as the pages are limited here, I have excluded these and many more issues.  
1.3 Method 
The method of this study is based on the theory of perspective relativism on the other 
hand and theory of legal practice on the other. The former draws inspiration especially 
from Antti Hautamäki’s introduction to the topic.31 The latter is based on dissertation of 
Samuli Hurri.32 Perspective relativism refers to philosophical view where knowledge 
assertions are proportioned with perspectives.33 Perspective is a way to examine reality 
from a certain viewpoint. According to relativist account, it is impossible to discuss 
anything without taking upon a certain perspective. However, this does not mean that all 
perspectives are equally good. Perspective relativism is also a critical account on 
perspectives.34 Typical for perspective relativism is limitation of the perspective to 
observe only certain features. For example, as Hautamäki notes with a reference to Karl 
Popper, relativism can be compared to searchlight: what it reveals depends on its position, 
intensity of the light, its colour and so on.35 Therefore, perspective relativism illuminates 
its target in a certain way. This leads to two outcomes. At first, perspective is always 
partial and constructed by the observer. This account emphasizes the active role of the 
one who views the target, instead of understanding looking as a passive practice.36 
Secondly, this enables the viewing of the target from different perspectives.37 
In this study, such searchlight comprises of three questions posed to the case 
material. A few words on this framework. The intention of this study is not to interpret 
any individual philosopher nor is it to provide practical interpretations on copyright law. 
                                                 
31 Antti Hautamäki, Näkökulmarelativismi: Tiedon suhteellisuuden ongelma. SoPhi 2018. 
32 Samuli Hurri, Birth of the European Individual: Outline of a Theory of Legal Practice. Helsingin 
yliopisto 2011. 
33 Hautamäki (2018), p.5. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hautamäki (2018), p.61. 
36 Hautamäki (2018), p.64. 
37 Hautamäki (2018), p.61. 
 9 
 
Posthumanist framework is deployed as an instrument to illuminate certain features from 
the research material, i.e. the cases. As instruments of research tend to be, also these ones 
are constructed by the researcher. The choices of instruments affect the results produced. 
A critical notion might call this type of methodology cherry-picking. However, I consider 
this to be in correspondence with the account of perspective relativism. It is understood 
in that theory as well as in this study that no perspective can provide a wholesome picture 
of a phenomenon. This study does not aim to provide ‘the truth’ of copyright and most 
times not even answers to questions. The laboratory here is for generating more questions. 
The second element of the method is theory of legal practice carried out by way of 
close reading of cases. While doctrinal approach is nearly impossible to avoid altogether, 
dogmatic reading38 is not the aim. Instead, the method of study is based on close reading 
of individual cases of the CJEU. This type of method has been introduced by Samuli Hurri 
in his dissertation. This theory of legal practice Hurri explains to consist of two aspects. 
First, theory of legal practice is a theory of the ways in which the law is practiced. 
Secondly, this method enables making visible the theories that practitioners of law carry 
in their activities.39 Instead of doctrinal issues, the attention is directed towards the more 
or less implicit ways the CJEU itself understands its actions. Yet, this does not mean that 
apparent self-explanations of the CJEU would be taken as given. The purpose of these 
methodical choices is to reveal something from the argumentation of the CJEU that is not 
communicated straightforward and finally perhaps to find a way beyond its self-
awareness and control. The interest of this study is what Hurri states with a reference to 
Foucault to be ‘what the cases do not explain but what nonetheless is present in the 
cases.’40 
This combination forms the methodological basis for this study. The originality 
cases of the CJEU are examined through three questions inspired by framework of 
posthumanism. These alternative positions of searchlight are then hoped to reveal 
something from cases that is not made explicit in them or what is at least less discussed. 
In this regard, it could be asked, why are we concerned about samurai robots and monkey 
selfies in the first place? If we leave aside practical difficulties, is there something more 
                                                 
38 Ari Hirvonen, Mitkä metodit? Yleisen oikeustieteen julkaisuja 2011, p.21-22: Legal dogmatics refers to 
clarification of generally valid legal principles and concepts. 
39 Hurri (2011), p.4. 
40 Hurri (2011), p.16. 
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to this issue? Why do we feel the need to centralize copyright system so strongly on 
humanity? Could it be that we fear the ‘otherness’ of machines and animals? Or could it 
rather be that in them we see ourselves and the otherness within us? 
Finally, although the aim here is not to provide a thorough reading of any specific 
theorist, I will shortly address the theoretical framework deployed here although this issue 
will be further discussed in the next section. One feature that might strike the reader as 
odd is the way this work refers to several theorists without thoroughly introducing their 
thought.  That is a choice made knowingly because of the instrumental nature of the 
theories used. While a study of this kind can certainly be conducted in a way where the 
thought of a philosopher is applied or contrasted to research material, this is not what has 
been done here. The three questions that serve as the perspectives in this study have been 
constructed in order to illuminate the area of the research question: what is it to be a 
human in copyright law. As discussed previously, what features eventually became 
visible were something quite other than what I initially anticipated. My theoretical 
framework aids to problematize and affords visibility to these features, but if any answers 
were to be provided, those would be provided in and by the material itself. Another reason 
is that my theoretical framework is not a unified philosophical account but indeed 
includes several different branches and outtakes. Therefore, the theory of this study 
should not be understood as interpretation of any individual philosopher, but consisting 
of concepts discussed within different philosophical frameworks. 
1.4 Theory 
A few words on posthumanist thought. Posthumanism is not a concise theory but rather 
an umbrella concept that includes several branches of thinking. Posthumanism can be 
divided into, for example, eco-critical accounts, human-animal studies and technological 
posthumanism. What binds these all together is the attempt to rethink the location of 
human in relation to non-human, whether it be technology, environment or animals. In 
this regard, posthumanism has been described as reactive thinking:41 as response to the 
changing world we live in and where new technologies emerge, gene manipulation 
develops and we encounter more and more complex environmental issues. This 
phenomenon, among others, has sparked questions regarding our human-centric way to 
                                                 
41 Karoliina Lummaa – Leea Rojola, Lukijalle in Karoliina Lummaa – Leea Rojola (ed.), Posthumanismi. 
Eetos 2014, p.8. 
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view the world. As Leea Rojola and Karoliina Lummaa note, posthumanist thinking 
searches for alternative, non-essentialist and non-hierarchical ways to understand features 
of different things as well as their relationships.42 
Indeed, often in the focus of posthumanist accounts is deconstruction of dualistic 
divisions typical for Western thought. Examples of these pairs are nature/culture, 
female/male and inside/outside. Posthumanist accounts claim that these realms cannot be 
clearly separated43 but they rather merge together or at least subjects and objects can 
move from one to other fluidly. Famous accounts of these kind of ‘hybridizations’ have 
been introduced by Donna Haraway44 and Bruno Latour.45 Both Haraway and Latour 
speak of the so-called naturecultures, which means the intertwining of things that have 
been previously thought as either natural or cultural.46 Similar thinking is deployed by 
Karen Barad, who uses as an example ultrasonography examination of the fetus. In this 
examination, technology provides a seemingly objective view to fetus and yet we 
interpret the picture appearing before us on cultural basis, attaching meanings to the 
image.47 Ultrasonography is therefore not a singular practice but ‘a cluster of material 
configurations and discursive practices’.48 Materiality, semantics and technology 
intertwine. 
In addition to confusing the boundaries between, for example, nature/culture and 
human/machine, another central project of posthumanist thought is critique of the 
privileged position of human.49 This critique is directed especially towards the type of 
humanism deriving from Enlightenment and the notion of human which is demarcated by 
rationality and autonomy. The implications of this kind of conceptualization of humanity 
have assumedly led to the exploitation of animals as well as overlooking the impact of 
structures that influence human choice. Understood this way, posthumanism has been 
greatly affected by the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann’s theory radically 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Donna Haraway, A Cyborg manifesto in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. 
Routledge 1990, p.6-10. 
45 Bruno Latour, Emme ole koskaan olleet moderneja. Vastapaino 2006. 
46 See e.g. Latour (2006), p.167-171; Donna Haraway, 
Modest−Witness@Second−Millennium.FemaleMan−Meets−OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience. 
Routledge 1997, p.60; Donna Haraway, When Species Meet. University of Minnesota Press 2008. 
47 Karen Barad, Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and 
meaning. Duke University Press 2007, p.201. 
48 Barad (2007), p.204. 
49 See e.g. Haraway (2008), p.106. 
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questioned the autonomy and rationality of human subject, understanding it rather as 
subordinate to the functioning of systems of communication.50 Similarly, structuralist and 
poststructuralist accounts have been important to posthumanist theory: human subject 
started to appear as a product of different kinds of structures and language.51 For example, 
Michel Foucault has stated that ‘human’ is only a contemporary and passing concept.52 
In that vein, it should be noted that posthumanist theory includes, in principle, two 
categories of accounts. Firstly, there are thinkers who identify as posthumanists and 
express their commitment to the posthumanist project. Such accounts include for example 
Donna Haraway, Cary Wolfe53 and Katharine N.Hayles,54 who have written some of the 
most important introductory pieces to posthumanist thought. However, not all theorists 
who have been regarded as posthumanist claim to be posthumanists themselves. For 
example, Foucault or Luhmann probably did not consider themselves as posthumanists, 
but their thinking nevertheless shares some of the central themes of what has later on 
come to be called posthumanism. 
This study focuses on the technologically oriented posthumanism. These accounts 
often link to the confusion of borders between corporeal existence and, for example, 
cybernetic mechanisms and robot technology.55 This type of understanding of 
posthumanism has been introduced by, e.g., N.Katherine Hayles’ in ‘How we became 
posthuman?’ Central questions in this regard have been, whether humanity undergoes 
definite changes in the technological context, and how does human eventually differ from 
machine.56 According to Franscesca Ferrando: ‘Posthumanism addresses the question 
‘who am I?’ in conjunction with other related questions, such as: ‘what am I?’ and ‘where 
and when are we?’57 These questions materialize in a number of situations. Firstly, 
posthumanist accounts have dealt with issues such as cyborgisation and technological 
                                                 
50 Karoliina Lummaa – Leea Rojola, Johdanto in Karoliina Lummaa – Leea Rojola (ed.), Posthumanismi. 
Eetos 2014, p.25. 
51 Lummaa – Rojola (2014) Johdanto, p.15.; Posthumanism shares some traits with, for example, 
anithumanism, transhumanism and new materialism. According to Francesca Ferrando, the common 
nominator is the conception of human as non-fixed and mutable condition. See Francesca Ferrando, 
Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: Differences and 
Relations. Existenz 8/2014, p.26-32, 26-27. 
52 Michel Foucault, Order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences. Routledge 1966, p.422. 
53 Cary Wolfe, What is posthumanism? University of Minnesota Press 2009. 
54 N. Katherine Hayles, How we became posthuman: Virtual bodies in cybernetics, literature and 
informatics. The University of Chicago Press 1999. 
55 Lummaa – Rojola (2014) Johdanto, p.17. 
56 Lummaa – Rojola (2014), Johdanto, p.19. 
57 Fransesca Ferrando, Posthumanism. Kilden Journal of Gender Research 2/2014, p. 168-172, 168. 
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enhancements of human. This way, borders between humans and machines become 
questionable in a quite concrete way. Secondly, as mentioned, posthumanist accounts can 
include more abstract approaches. Such is for example the idea that the human subject is 
not autonomous or rational but rather a product of different external practices.  
This study approaches the issue of humans and machines from the point of view 
where ‘human’ and ‘machine’ are understood primarily as categories of thinking, rather 
than concrete objects and subjects. While actual humans and machines appear in the 
cases, the main interest here is in the way the CJEU conceptualizes these realms. What 
kind of images of humanity and technology are created in the reasoning of the court and 
how do these attach to practice? What are humanity and technology like, and what 
happens if these are detached from their designated fields? Can these categories move in 
a way that humans may be understood as machine-like and technology as human-like? 
Or would they perhaps merge together? In order to approach these questions, the study 
deploys oppositional pairs of creativity/automation, human/technology and 
rationality/sensuous. Via these distinctions, I hope to open a view to rethinking central 
position of human in copyright system. Now let us begin. 
2 Humans and machines 
2.1 Introduction 
Adolf Eichmann was a Nazi criminal who was responsible for transfers to concentration 
camps in Nazi Germany.58 Hannah Arendt described his behaviour almost mechanical, 
without intention or specific malevolence for that matter. According to Arendt: ‘There 
was no sign in him of firm ideological conviction or of specific evil motives, and the only 
notable characteristic one could detect in his past behaviour as well as in his behaviour 
during the trial and throughout the pre-trial police examination was something entirely 
negative: it was not stupidity but thoughtlesness.’59 According to Oxford dictionary 
Lexico, ‘mechanical’ is defined as ‘an action done without thought or spontaneity; 
automatic.’60  When it comes to copyright, the perception of an author has its background 
in the 18-century humanist thought: the concept of ‘human’ accompanying it is essentially 
                                                 
58 Tuija Parvikko, Prology in Hannah Arendt, Eichmann Jerusalemissa: raportti pahuuden 
arkipäiväisyydestä. Docendo 2016, p.5. 
59 Hannah Arendt, Life of the mind. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1978, p.4. 
60 Lexico. Oxford University Press 2019. Available at: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mechanical. Last visited 3.9.2019. 
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about individual freedom and natural self. The so-called ‘romantic author’ is a genius.61 
You cannot be a genius if you cannot think. Is thinking then something fundamentally 
human, something without which we lose our humanity? If we consider creativity as 
something that belongs to humanity and automated/mechanic something that belongs to 
machines, can that difference be found precisely from the mind? Let us take a further look 
at this issue. 
Mind has certainly had an important role in justification theories for copyright. 
These theories are traditionally divided into two: utilitarian theories and personality 
theories.62 Utilitarian theories are sometimes linked to Locke while personality theories 
are associated with Hegel’s work.63 Personality theory derived from Hegel’s thought is 
illuminating more generally in terms of human-centric – and thought-centric – approach 
in copyright law. Personality theory sees copyright as something emanating from the 
author himself.64 As Peter Drahos interprets Hegel, work reflects the author’s 
personality65 and only humans can have personality. As work is seen to originate from 
the author, it must bear elements from the author’s personality in order to get copyright 
protection.66 Martha Woodmansee explains this approach by noting that the 18-century 
thought began to emphasise inspiration instead of craftsmanship while the source of 
inspiration was internalized.67 The inspiration was not drawn from the outside but from 
the person himself. To this day, similar understanding of author’s personality as 
embedded in the work has an effect on the judicial evaluation.68  In copyright theory, 
features such as intention, free will and creativity are usually associated exclusively with 
                                                 
61 Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of the 'Author'. E'ighteenth-Century Studies 17(4) 1984, p.245-448, p.247.; Erlend Lavik, 
Romantic authorship in copyright law and use of aesthetics in Mirelle van Eechoud (ed.), Work of 
authorship. Amsterdam University Press 2014, p.46. 
62 Anette Kur – Thomas Dreier, European intellectual property law: Text, cases and materials. Edward 
Elgar 2013, p.241-242. 
63 Ballardini – He – Roos (2019), p.119. Some accounts have also systematised these differently, linking 
Locke, Kant and Hegel together under personality theory. This way the counterpart is utilitarian economic 
theory, see e.g. Caterina Sganga, Propertizing European Copyright: History, Challenges and 
Opportunities. Edward Elgar 2018, p.18-19. 
64 See eg. Woodmansee (1984), p.427. 
65 Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Ashgate 1996, p.75-76. 
66 Andreas Rahmatian, Originality in UK copyright law: the old "skill and labour" doctrine under 
pressure. IIC 44(1) 2013 p.4-34, 5-6. 
67 Woodmansee (1984), p.427. 
68 Rahmatian (2013), p.6: Especially in the so-called d’roit auteur (author’s rights) countries.  
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humanity.69 Ability to create and therefore have personality become interconnected with 
the individual’s inner world. Maybe we could think that according to this approach 
creativity indeed originates from the mind. 
Is ‘mind’ truly a primary feature of humanity then? Primary feature of everything? 
N. Katharine Hayles presented an example of this kind of thinking in her research of the 
so-called Macy-conferences in 1946-1953.70 Hayles concluded that the essential legacy 
of early cybernetics was exactly the setting of ‘information over materiality’.71 The 
researchers who participated in the conference thought that the behaviour of living 
creatures could be conceptualized in a similar way as computers, that is, as information 
processes. In the Macy-conferences, researchers presented mechanical animals that 
transformed these kinds of computational processes into concrete action that could be 
observed.72 One of the mechanical animals was a robot rat that navigated autonomously 
in a maze.73 This could be considered as a good example of something acting 
mechanically, or automatically: that is, acting to serve a pre-defined purpose without 
option to influence the process. In a way, the rat is utterly rational. If it cannot go left, it 
goes right. This type of action is at the same time instrumental and self-purposeful. Rat 
moves to clear the maze, but does not need incentive or vision of a bigger picture: the 
only reason for movement is the task, which is programmed to its system. The rat cannot 
suddenly give up or decide that it is happier staying still. It does not have any other option, 
but to move in the maze. An idea behind the mechanical animals was that if they could 
be observed and understood as ‘pure information’ maybe the same applied to humans as 
well.74 Maybe functioning of a human mind could be understood similarly as functioning 
of a computer.  
In the light of this example, prioritizing ‘mind’ did not lead to creativity as 
understood in Hegelian personality theory. Instead, attempts to thoroughly understand the 
functioning of the mind appeared to lead to the opposite: to automation. Therefore, the 
                                                 
69 See eg. Anette Àlen-Savikko – Rosa Ballardini –Taina Pihlajarinne, Tekoälyn tuotokset ja 
omaperäisyysvaatimus – kohti koneorientoitunutta tekijänoikeutta? Lakimies 7-8/2018, p.975–995, 989-
990. 
70 N. Katherine Hayles, How we became posthuman. The University of Chicago Press 1999. 
71 Hayles (1999), p.50-51.  
72 Karoliina Lummaa – Leea Rojola, Johdanto: Mitä posthumanismi on in Karoliina Lummaa – Leea 
Rojola (ed.), Posthumanismi. Eetos 2014, p.15. 
73 Hayles (1999), p. 63-64. 
74 Hayles (1999), p. 56-57. 
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answer to the question ‘can we find difference between humanity and machine from the 
thinking’ is not that clear. Persons can act without thinking. Mechanical animals can be 
reduced to only thinking. What belongs to human and what belongs to machine appears 
to be not self-evident. Here, the difference between human and machine will be chased 
via three questions posed to the case material. First section addresses the question, what 
actions does the CJEU consider creative and what are considered mechanical. Does 
creativity belong to humanity and what is it like to be creative? Second section then asks 
if there is indeed a difference between humans and machines, how is that difference 
mediated? If we return to image of a mechanical rat, how are technological processes 
transformed into something that can be observed? Third section then returns to the human 
mind. Can mind be understood completely rationalized, like the rat in the maze? Or is 
there after all something that stubbornly escapes rationalization? Third question is 
therefore, what kind of difference can be found inside the mind.  
2.2 Automation 
2.2.1 Introduction 
What is it to be creative? In this section, the notion is examined in contrast with the 
concept of automated/mechanic. Previously the connection between mind, thinking and 
creativity was addressed: the absence of these appeared to imply that actions were 
mechanical rather than creative. However, further examination revealed that this question 
was not self-explanatory. As was seen with the example of mechanical rat, the reduction 
of organisms to ‘only thinking’ did not lead to more creativity, at least in terms of 
personality theory, but to automation. In this study, automation is understood as acting 
without possibility or intent to have effect on the process. This way, the outcome is pre-
defined. Could creativity then be the opposite? Having sufficiently options to choose 
from, devoid of external restrictions? 
Certain idea has definitely been included in the famous line of cases from the 
CJEU75: Infopaq, Football Association Premiere League and Murphy, Painer and 
Football Dataco. These cases will be now discussed. From these cases, one concept 
emerges strongly: that is freedom to choose. ‘Free choices’ have been famously addressed 
                                                 
75 Àlen-Savikko –Ballardini –Pihlajarinne (2018), p.982.; Christian Handig, The "sweat of the brow" is 
not enough! - more than a blueprint of the European copyright term "work"  E.I.P.R. 35(6) 2013 p.334-
340, 337. 
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in case Painer76, however, it might turn out that in terms of freedom these cases have 
more in common that what meets the eye. In terms of this inquiry, ‘free choices’ appears 
to serve as a certain kind of distinction-making apparatus between concepts of automation 
and creativity. Now this interplay between automation, creativity and free choices is taken 
into examination.  
This section asks, what kind of actions did the CJEU consider creative and what 
actions were deemed mechanical. If there indeed was a division between these, who were 
those that acted creatively and who did not? In other words, did creativity belong to 
humanity in the spirit of Hegelian personality theory? Finally, what part did free choices 
eventually play in this assumed distinction-making.  If we return to our minds the 
examples presented previously (samurai robot, AI author, mechanical rat), perhaps we 
can find something that helps us to draw borders between these machines that act like 
humans and ourselves. Or maybe we will find that it is human who sometimes acts like a 
machine. 
2.2.2 Infopaq: automated processes 
Let us begin this analysis by first addressing the question of what constitutes an automated 
process. This issue is illuminated in the case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske 
Dagblades Forening, delivered in 2009. Defendant in the proceedings was Infopaq, a 
business that operated media analysis and monitoring service. Infopaq produced short 
summaries of news articles published in Danish daily newspapers.77 To do that, Infopaq 
used an ‘automated process’ (‘data capture process’). The process included scanning of 
the articles and converting them into digital files. The files were then electronically 
processed.78 As a final part the extract of 11 words was printed. The other pleader, Danske 
Dagblades Forening (DDF) was a professional association of Danish daily newspaper 
publishers, who assisted its members with copyright issues. In 2005, DDF had become 
aware of Infopaq’s practices and concluded that Infopaq would need consent from 
relevant rightsholders to continue its business.79 Infopaq disagreed and brought the case 
to court, where it was dismissed. Infopaq then brought an appeal before the referring court 
                                                 
76 C‑145/10 Painer, para 89-90. 
77 C‑5/08 Infopaq, para 13. 
78 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 2. 
79 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 14-15. 
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in the case, the Danish Højesteret.80 The Højesteret referred 13 questions to the CJEU of 
which two will be analyzed here. Firstly, the referring court asked the CJEU whether the 
storing and printing of extracts consisting of 11 words constituted ‘reproduction in part’ 
within the meaning of Article 2(a) InfoSoc Directive.81 Secondly, the referring court 
asked whether Infopaq’s data capture process satisfied the conditions of exemption in 
Article 5(1) InfoSoc Directive and could be therefore carried out without rightsholder’s 
consent.82  
Let us start with the question regarding Article 2(a), although the observations will 
be mainly focused to the application of Article 5(1). The referring court asked, whether 
an extract of 11 words from newspaper article constituted a ‘reproduction in part’. First, 
what does “reproduction” mean and how did the Court interpret this concept? Right of 
reproduction is one of the basic elements of economic rights in the copyright system.83 
Article 2(a) states that: 
Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or 
indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or 
in part: 
(a) for authors, of their works; 
There we have two important pieces: exclusive right for reproduction which is afforded 
to authors in respect to their works. An exclusive right to reproduce, copy, a work could 
be regarded the core of copyright law.84 It means that only a person who created the 
original work can produce copies of the original. ‘Reproduction’ could be simplified as 
giving a physical form to the work, i.e. materializing it.85 However, also reproductions in 
digital form belong to scope of protection.86 Right of reproduction was harmonized in 
InfoSoc Directive.87 Yet, ‘reproduction’ is not defined, beyond being expressed to apply 
                                                 
80 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 22. 
81 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 30. 
82 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 53. 
83 Christopher Geiger – Franciska Schönherr, The Information Society Directive in Irina Stamatoudi – 
Paul Torremans (ed.), EU Copyright Law: A Commentary. Edward Elgar 2014, p.401. 
84 Isabella Alexander, The concept of reproduction and the "temporary and transient" exception. C.L.J. 
68(3) 2009, p. 520-523, 520.; Tuomas Mylly, Tekijänoikeuden ideologiat ja myytit. Lakimies 2/2004 p. 
228–254, 229: According to Mylly copyright means possibility to limit the copying of the work, making 
the work available for public and exploitation of derivative works. 
85 Pirkko-Liisa Haarmann, Immateriaalioikeus. Alma Talent 2014, p.72. 
86 Geiger – Schönherr (2014), p.401. 
87 Kur – Dreier (2013), p.270. 
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to ‘direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, 
in whole or in part.’88 
In Infopaq, the CJEU provided a teleological interpretation of the InfoSoc Directive 
to provide more specific definition for the concept of ‘reproduction’.89 First, the Court 
held that as Article 2(a) states that authors have the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit 
reproduction of their works, the scope of the reproduction right must be intended to cover 
‘work’.  
Then how about the interpretation of the concept of ‘work’? In its decision, the 
CJEU stated that Article 2(a) is applied to subject-matter, that is original in the sense that 
it is its author’s own intellectual creation.90 This was the most famous finding of the 
CJEU: the definition for ‘originality’. Originality is one of the key concepts in copyright 
law: works that are not original will not receive copyright protection.91 Furthermore, it 
plays an important role in infringement proceedings.92 As was the case in Infopaq, if 
reproductions do not share the originality of the work, making them will not infringe the 
author’s rights. Until Infopaq, only computer programs, databases and photographs were 
protected by copyright under the definition of ‘author’s own intellectual creation’.93 In 
Infopaq, the CJEU developed a standard test for the scope of protection by giving the 
concept of originality an autonomous definition in EU copyright law.94  In practice, this 
meant harmonization of the originality criterion in the EU Member States.95 Regarding 
application of Article 2(a), the CJEU made two further findings. Firstly, parts of the work 
are also protected by copyright if they share the originality of the whole.96 Secondly, an 
author can express his creativity in an original manner through the ‘choice, sequence and 
                                                 
88 Alexander (2009), p.520. 
89 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 32: The CJEU held that such concepts must be defined ‘having regard to the 
wording and context of Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive, where the reference to them is to be found, as 
well as in the light of both the overall objectives of the Directive and international law.’; Eleonora Rosati, 
Originality in a work, or a work of originality: the effects of the Infopaq decision. E.I.P.R. 33(12) 2011, 
p.746-755, 755. 
90 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 37. 
91 Agustin Waisman, Revisiting originality. E.I.P.R. 31(7) 2009 p.370-376, 370. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Rosati (2013), p.98. 
94 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 27; Stephen Vousden, Infopaq and the Europeanisation of copyright law. 
W.I.P.O.J. 1(2) 2010 p.197-210, 200: It has also been noted that ‘autonomous concept doctrine’ is 
somewhat problematic as the EU only has shared competence in the field of IP law, unlike eg. in the field 
of customs and tariffs where the EU has exclusive competence and where the doctrine stems from. 
95 Rosati (2011), p.750. 
96 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 38. 
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combination’ of words.97 Therefore, even parts of sentences could convey the originality 
of a publication.  
Whether extract of 11 words would indeed come within the concept of reproduction 
was left for the national court to decide.98 Should the answer be yes, questions concerning 
the exceptions set out at Article 5(1) InfoSoc Directive would become relevant.99 Article 
5(1) lists the conditions based on which the exemption from the application of Article 2 
might be granted: 
 (1) Temporary acts of reproduction referred to in Article 2, which are transient or 
incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a technological process and whose sole 
purpose is to enable: 
(a)      a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or 
(b)      a lawful use 
of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which have no independent economic 
significance, shall be exempted from the reproduction right provided for in Article 2. 
While economic rights, such as right to reproduction, are reserved to authors, not all uses 
of work lead to infringement. Certain uses covered by ‘exception or limitation’ are outside 
the control of the author.100 The limitations set in Article 5(1) InfoSoc Directive are 
mandatory, although the list is otherwise ‘optional exhaustive’.101 Infopaq claimed that 
the acts of reproduction fulfilled the conditions of Article 5(1) relating to transient nature 
of reproduction, since the reproductions were deleted at the end of the electronic 
process.102 In its evaluation that followed the wording of Article 5(1), the Court stated 
that the act was temporary and transient when it was intended to enable the completion 
of a technological process of which it forms an integral and essential part.103 Legal 
certainty for rightsholders further required that the storage and deletion of the 
reproductions is not dependent on human intervention.104 From this, it followed that an 
act of reproduction could be held ‘transient’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) firstly if 
its duration was limited to what was necessary for the proper completion of the 
technological process.105 Secondly, that process must be automated so that it deletes the 
                                                 
97 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 45. 
98 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 51. 
99 Alexander (2009), p.521. 
100 Geiger – Schönherr (2014), p.437. 
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reproductions of newspaper articles automatically once the 11-word extracts have been 
produced.106 
At this point an observation can be made. Often matter with reproductions is exactly 
that: producing something. In this case, the question was about producing copies to some 
extent as well, especially regarding storing and printing of the 11 word extracts. However, 
equally important is the question regarding deletion of the reproductions. While 
contemporary academic discussion has vastly included topics that relate to machines 
creating something, now the setting is opposite. In Infopaq, machines destroy and they 
do it automatically, unlike humans. This is the peculiar way in which the question of 
automation opens before us in Infopaq. The word ‘automation’ is not used in the 
Directive, but the Court used automation to refer to circumstances that create an 
exemption from the author’s exclusive right for reproduction. 
How did the CJEU perceive the concept of ‘automated’ then? Let us first take a 
look at the Advocate General’s (AG) Opinion, which sheds light on this question. To 
define whether a process is automated, it was first necessary to define what kind of 
process was in question. First, the relevant publications were registered manually by 
Infopaq employees in an electronic registration database. Secondly, the spines were cut 
off from the newspapers so that they could be scanned. The section to be scanned was 
selected from the registration database before the publication was put into the scanner. 
Then the image file produced by scanning was converted into a text file that could be 
understood by a text processing program. The text file was processed to find a search 
word defined beforehand. Each time a match for a search word was found in the 
publication, the section and the page number on which the match appeared was given. 
This way the reader of the article could find the search word. To make this easier, the five 
words, which come before and after the search word, were captured. At the end of the 
process, the text file was deleted and a cover sheet was printed of all the pages where the 
relevant search word was found.107  
Now, according to the AG, the technological process in this case covered the entire 
process of the production of extracts from newspaper articles. All of its phases, even those 
                                                 
106 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 64. 
107 C‑5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para 15; 
C‑5/08 Infopaq, para 21. 
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carried out manually, were part of the technological process.108 Therefore, each of the 
phases could also be regarded as an integral or essential part of a technological process 
in the meaning of Article 5(1). This implies that the operation of a machine may include 
also human performing, such as the scanning, and the cutting of the spine of publication. 
According to the AG, the requirement that an act forms an integral and essential 
part of a technological process was fulfilled, even regarding the phases carried out by 
humans. But did that mean that all human actions were automatic? This seems to hold 
true for the actions before printing. However, as the criteria laid down in Article 5(1) are 
cumulative, the non-compliance with any of the conditions will lead to the act of 
reproduction not being exempted from the reproduction right provided for in Article 2.109 
Therefore, the AG considered whether the reproduction was of transient nature as well.  
In the context of transient nature, the AG considered human contribution 
differently. Firstly, the AG explains that a number of reproductions can be identified in 
the process.110 According to the AG, it was possible that creation and conversion of the 
image files constituted transient reproductions, as long as they were automatically deleted 
from the computer memory.111 Regarding the storing of a text extract of 11 words, the 
AG considered the evidence insufficient, as the national court had not indicated for how 
long those words remain stored in the computer’s memory.112 At any event, the 
reproduction that certainly would not be automatically destroyed was the print of the 
extract. According to the AG, act of printing constitutes a lasting reproduction. This is 
not because it would last forever, but because the user alone decides when to destroy it.113  
The CJEU agreed with the AG, emphasizing the element of human intervention 
involved in the storage and deletion of the reproduction. The creation and conversion of 
image files might constitute a transient reproduction as long as they were deleted 
automatically from the computer memory.114 Also regarding the storing of 11-word 
extracts the Court agreed with the AG, stating that evidence was insufficient to evaluate 
whether the technological process was automated.115 However, by printing the extract 
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Infopaq was ‘making a reproduction outside the sphere of computer technology’.116 
According to the CJEU, it was not certain that the person concerned would want to delete 
the reproduction once its existence would no longer be needed for the completion of a 
technological process.117 The CJEU explained that for example reproductions, which 
enable browsing and caching are created and deleted automatically, and therefore without 
human intervention.118 Printing makes a difference, however. Once the reproduction has 
been affixed onto a medium such as paper, it disappears only when the paper itself is 
destroyed.119 This kind of action can only be taken by a human: 
Moreover, since the data capture process is apparently not likely itself to destroy that 
medium, the deletion of that reproduction is entirely dependent on the will of the user 
of that process. It is not at all certain that he will want to dispose of the reproduction, which 
means that there is a risk that the reproduction will remain in existence for a longer period, 
according to the user’s needs.120  
The deletion is dependent on the will of the user, says the Court. This brings us back to 
the beginning, where role of free choices was discussed. In Infopaq, that concept receives 
quite an interesting content. When humans were not able to intervene, the process could 
be considered automated, as was possibly the case with the creation and conversion of 
image files and storing of 11-word extracts. When there was a possibility for intervention, 
the process ceased to be automated. Intervention on the other hand appears to be 
connected to the will: if the destroying of the reproductions was dependent on the choices 
of human, the process could not be considered automated. Does this back up the 
hypothesis that free will is indeed in at the center of creativity, when contrasted with 
automation? The implications are not that straightforward. 
In terms of personality theory, the justification for the author’s exclusive right for 
reproduction is that the author’s personality is supposed to reside in the work. Therefore, 
also the reproductions of the original carry parts of that personality. Right to reproduction 
could be said to derive from the production of the original. However, in this case the 
question was not so much about producing, but to great extent about destroying. For work 
to be considered original, the personality should be involved. At this point, it is not 
entirely clear what personality is, but human contribution seems to be linked to free 
choices. Now, when something needs to be destroyed Article 5(1) InfoSoc Directive 
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includes a mechanism that presupposes automation and therefore absence of human 
contribution. If humans are able to intervene the process, it ceases to be automated and 
exemption of Article 5(1) will not apply. Is this ability to choose whether to intervene or 
not somehow in the core of personality that is also a prerequisite for work to be considered 
original? In the decision, this kind of outline of personality was both present and absent. 
Firstly, the acts considered mechanical were not entirely carried out by technology but 
the CJEU considered it possible for humans to act that way as well. The humans could 
‘belong’ to a machine, i.e. to an automated technological process. This was the case 
regarding the manual scanning of articles. In these terms, both the AG and the CJEU 
concluded that also these parts, in fact carried out by humans, were integral and essential 
part of the technological process, as they were necessary phases in completing it. This 
way, human actions could be considered automated. However, the destroying of 
reproductions was not automated as humans were able to exercise their freedom to choose 
whether to destroy the print or not. Freedom to choose would indeed appear to be the 
central concept but it was not linked to all humans that appeared in the case. As long as 
humans did not make choices, their actions were mechanical. With the next case, these 
implications of automation and human intervention will be further examined. 
2.2.3 Football Association Premier League: on human intervention 
In Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC 
Leisure and Others (FAPL) and C-429/08 Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services 
Ltd, (Murphy) 121 the references concerned two cases. I will be concentrating this 
examination mainly on the former. The references in that case were made between 
‘Football Association Premier League Ltd and others (‘FAPL and others’)’122, suppliers 
of satellite decoding devices123 and operators of public houses.124 Two of the actions were 
brought against suppliers of satellite decoding devices.125 Third action was brought 
                                                 
121 C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and C-429/08 
Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2011:631. 
122 Football Association Premier League Ltd (FAPL), NetMed Hellas SA (NetMed Hellas) and 
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124 Mr Madden, SR Leisure Ltd, Mr Houghton and Mr Owen (‘operators of public houses’). 
125 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 44. 
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against operators of public houses relating to infringement of copyrights belonging to 
FAPL and others.126  
FAPL ran the Premier League, the leading professional football league competition 
for football clubs in England. They also organized filming of Premier League matches 
and transmission of the signal to the broadcasters.127 FAPL granted licences for live 
transmission on a territorial basis for three-year terms.128 The signal was compressed and 
encrypted, and then transmitted by satellite to subscribers who received the signal using 
a satellite dish. The signal was decrypted and decompressed in a satellite decoder, which 
required a decoding device such as a decoder card for its operation.129 In the United 
Kingdom certain pubs had begun to use foreign decoding devices to access Premier 
League matches. These allowed them to receive the broadcast in another Member State 
with fewer expenses. These kind of decoder cards had been manufactured and marketed 
with the authorisation of the service provider. However, the broadcasters had only 
authorised their use inside a specified national territory, not in the UK.130 Therefore, the 
devices were used in an unauthorised manner.  
FAPL and others brought actions against suppliers of satellite decoders and 
operators of pubs that used the devices.131 FAPL and others claimed that this kind of use 
of the devices undermined the territorial exclusivity of the rights granted by licence and 
hence the value of rights belonging to them.132 FAPL and others also claimed that pub 
owners who used the devices had infringed their copyrights to certain works by creating 
copies of works in the internal memory of the satellite decoder and by showing them on 
television screens as well as communicating them to the public.133 The works in question 
included for example the Opening Sequence Film, Opening Sequence Graphics Film and 
Match Highlights Film.134  
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Together, the High Court of Justice referred to the CJEU 18 questions. Some of 
them relate to Broadcasting Directives: Conditional Access Directive135 and Satellite 
Broadcasting Directive.136 These will not be discussed here: the examination will 
concentrate on third action, that is, on the CJEU’s interpretation on the same points of the 
InfoSoc Directive as were discussed above in the context of the Infopaq case. Secondly, 
interpretation of Article 3(1) InfoSoc Directive governing ‘communication to the public’ 
will be addressed. The questions referred to the CJEU regarding InfoSoc Directive were, 
as reformulated by the Court, whether Article 2(a) meant that the reproduction right 
extends to the creation of transient sequential fragments of the works within the memory 
of a satellite decoder and on a television screen.137 As to Article 5(1), the question was 
whether acts of reproduction performed within the memory of a satellite decoder and on 
a television screen fulfilled the conditions laid down in that Article.138 That is, whether 
the acts were to be considered as temporary acts of reproduction which are transient or 
incidental and an integral and essential part of a technological process, and therefore 
exempt from the protection of copyright. Finally, there is one new Article. These 
questions concerned ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) 
InfoSoc Directive, which will be further introduced below. 
Let us begin with the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 2(a) InfoSoc Directive 
concerning right of reproduction. FAPL and others had claimed that pub owners had 
infringed their copyrights by creating copies of the works in the internal memory of the 
satellite decoder and by showing the works on television screen in public houses. The 
national court was uncertain whether the reproduction right extended to the creation of 
transient images within the memory of decoder box and on a television screen. The 
problem was especially the extent of reproduction, i.e. whether the work was reproduced 
in whole or in part. If the sequential fragments that created the images on television screen 
were considered together the work would have been produced as a whole. However, only 
a limited number of fragments existed at a certain point in time. Therefore, the referring 
court asked whether it should consider all of the fragments of each work as a whole or 
                                                 
135 Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the legal 
protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access. OJ L 320, 28.11.1998, p. 54–57. 
136 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning 
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission. OJ 
L 248, 6.10.1993, p. 15–21. 
137 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 153. 
138 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 160. 
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only the limited number of fragments existing at the moment.139 The Court concluded 
that the unit composed of the fragments reproduced simultaneously – and therefore 
existing at a given moment – should be examined in order to determine whether it contains 
expression, which is the intellectual creation of the author of the work. If it did, it must 
be classified as partial reproduction for the purposes of Article 2(a).140  
After that, the CJEU still had to consider whether acts of reproduction would fulfil 
the criteria of Article 5(1) InfoSoc Directive. The CJEU stated that it was undisputed that 
the acts of reproduction concerned satisfy the first three conditions laid down in Article 
5(1). They were temporary, transient and formed an integral part of a technological 
process.141 The CJEU did not elaborate this further but the AG’s Opinion sheds light to 
the issue. The AG explains that an act can be held to be ‘transient’ if: 
[ … ] its duration is limited to what is necessary for the proper completion of the 
technological process in question, it being understood that process must be automated so 
that it deletes the act automatically, without human intervention, once its function of 
enabling the completion of such a process has come to an end.142  
We can see that the question of automation is back. Again, process was considered 
automated when the reproduction is deleted automatically and humans cannot interfere. 
The AG’s reasoning appears to back up the hypothesis of the previous section as well: for 
an act to be considered ‘automated’ it must not involve human intervention. More clues 
can be found from the CJEU’s decision. After concluding that first three conditions were 
fulfilled the CJEU moved to address the fourth and fifth conditions: whether acts were to 
be considered as lawful use and having independent economic significance.143 The CJEU 
stated that acts of reproduction at issue satisfied also the fourth condition of Article 5(1) 
and were to be considered as lawful use.144 Now, in terms of this inquiry, truly interesting 
is the CJEU’s notion regarding the fifth condition, independent economic significance. 
Let us take a further look at this part of the CJEU’s decision.  
According to the CJEU, the acts of reproduction were carried out in order to provide 
access to the protected works. As the protected works had economic significance, access 
to them was bound to have economic value as well.145 However, that significance must 
                                                 
139 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 54(4). 
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142 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, Opinion of AG Kokott, para 88. Abbreviations added. 
143 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 166. 
144 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 173. 
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also be independent. Therefore, mere reception of the broadcasts would not generate 
additional economic value. In that regard, the CJEU stated that: 
[ … ] the temporary acts of reproduction, carried out within the memory of the satellite 
decoder and on the television screen, form an inseparable and non-autonomous part of the 
process of reception of the broadcasts transmitted containing the works in question. 
Furthermore, they are performed without influence, or even awareness, on the part of the 
persons thereby having access to the protected works.146 
As the reproductions were elemental part of the technological process that enabled the 
reception of broadcasts, those acts of reproduction were not capable of generating an 
additional economic advantage.147 From the quotation, we can see that we are again 
heading towards the issues of automation and human intervention. The reproductions in 
question were considered as inseparable and non-autonomous part of the technological 
process, somewhat similarly as humans in case Infopaq regarding manual preparations of 
technological process. Back then, humans were included into technological process, as 
they could not have effect on its outcome. What appears to play important part also in this 
case is the fact that persons involved cannot influence the process and are not even aware 
of it. In Infopaq, when persons on the other hand could influence the technological 
process, the Article 5(1) did not apply. Now the CJEU considered the issue differently 
and all the requirements of Article 5(1) were fulfilled.148  
The Court’s interpretation of the concept of ‘communication to the public’ seems 
to support these conclusions. The referring court’s inquiry related especially to Article 
3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, which governs ‘communication to the public’, stating that: 
Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the 
making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may 
access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.149 
Regarding actions of pub operators, the referring court asked whether ‘communication to 
the public’ must be interpreted as covering transmission of the broadcast works, via a 
television screen and speakers, to the customers present in a public house.150 The CJEU 
concluded that the screening of football matches in a pub constituted a ‘communication 
                                                 
146 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 176. Abbreviations added. 
147 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 177. 
148 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 180. 
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to the public’ for which the authorization of the rightsholders was necessary.151 Regarding 
this question, the CJEU referred to another case, SGAE152, where it had held that a hotel 
proprietor carried out an act of communication when he gave his customers access to the 
broadcast works by distributing in the hotel rooms, with full knowledge, the signal 
carrying the protected works.153 The Court pointed out that this type of intervention was 
not just a technical means to ensure or improve reception of the original broadcast in the 
catchment area, but an act without which customers could not enjoy the broadcast 
works.154 Thus, the Court held that: 
[ … ] the proprietor of a public house intentionally gives the customers present in that 
establishment access to a broadcast containing protected works via a television screen and 
speakers. Without his intervention the customers cannot enjoy the works broadcast, even 
though they are physically within the broadcast’s catchment area. Thus, the circumstances 
of such an act prove comparable to those in SGAE.155 
The significant element in the Court’s evaluation was the proprietor’s intentional 
behavior: his knowledge of the actions against the will and authorization of rightsholders 
and acting based on that knowledge. His intervention was also a prerequisite for the 
customers to have access to broadcast. As in SGAE, the intervention could not be regarded 
as mechanical.   
Finally, one more aspect regarding matters of automation and free will. This point 
relates to the other case that the CJEU addressed, case Murphy. The CJEU’s judgment in 
Murphy includes an interesting notion relating to scope of copyright protection: FAPL 
could have rights to the recordings, logos etc., but not to the football matches as such, as 
they could not be classified as works.156 To be so classified, the subject-matter concerned 
would have to be original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation.157 
As the CJEU explains: 
However, sporting events cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as works 
within the meaning of the [ InfoSoc ] Directive. That applies in particular to football 
matches, which are subject to rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for 
the purposes of copyright.158 
                                                 
151 C-403/08 and C-429/08 FAPL, para 207. 
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According to the CJEU, the interpretation applies in particular to football matches. This 
is because football matches are subject to rules of the game.159 Those kind of events 
cannot be protected under copyright. The Court then raises the question of creative 
freedom, noting that following rules plays out this element. How should the meaning of 
rules be considered in relation to notions of automation, creativity and free will? Could 
we think that in the core of ‘automation’ resides a rule? At least that would explain some 
of the peculiar findings in case Infopaq. When humans were included into technological 
process it was asked, whether that was because humans had limited possibilities to have 
effect on the outcome of the process. Although the CJEU appeared to think that way, the 
accuracy of this conclusion can be questioned. In reality, there is likely nothing that would 
make humans to realize certain outcome in technological process. Unlike mechanical rat 
in the maze, humans in general have the ability to stop, make mistakes or act alternatively. 
However, if we would instead think that following rules is what constitutes mechanic 
actions, the outcome of the process does not need to be fully certain. It would be enough 
that rules exist to guide the operation.  
Let us now draw some conclusions. Firstly, as the AG concluded in relation to 
transient nature of reproduction, it would indeed seem to be human intervention that 
deems the technological process non-automated. Furthermore, from the Court’s 
elaboration on the issue of independent economic significance, we can see elements of 
what this intervention is like. This was an act that was performed without influence or 
even awareness of humans. While in Infopaq the exceptions of Article 5(1) did not apply 
as the humans could interfere, now the situation was different. The humans could not 
interfere, and were not even aware of the process, so Article 5(1) applied. From this, we 
got to the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 3(1). Now the nature of human intervention 
was again elaborated. Regarding actions of pub owners, the Court stated that they were 
not to be considered as mere technical measures. This was because the pub owners 
intentionally, by their own choosing, gave the access to protected works. Freedom of 
choice appears to be linked to the human ability to intervene, thus turning the process 
non-automated. In other words, it seems to be the freedom of choice that constitutes non-
mechanical action. But what then is mechanical action? This issue was illuminated in the 
final finding. The Court found that rules of the game made actions non-creative. When 
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rules apply, there is no room for creative freedom. From this concluding notion, we can 
move to discuss the creative freedom in a more detail with the next case. 
2.2.4 Painer: creative freedom 
We have now collected some materials for an idea of what it means to be mechanical. 
Next case, in turn, will discuss what it means to be creative. In Case C‑145/10 Eva-Maria 
Painer160 the reference was made in the proceedings between Ms Painer and five 
newspaper publishers concerning their use of Ms Painer’s photographs of Natascha 
Kampusch,161 a girl who later appeared in wider publicity because of her abduction. 
Kampusch was abducted in 1998 and held in captivity for over 8 years. Ms Painer had 
worked as a freelance photographer, photographing children in nurseries and 
kindergartens. She had also taken several photographs of Natascha Kampusch as a child, 
designing their background, deciding the position and facial expression, and producing 
and developing the photos.162 After Natascha Kampusch was abducted, the security 
authorities launched a search appeal in which the contested photographs were used. In 
2006, Kampusch managed to escape from her abductor. Following Kampusch’s escape 
and prior to her first public appearance, the defendants in the main proceedings published 
Ms Painer’s photographs from 1998 as well as the so-called ‘photo-fit’ based on Ms 
Painer’s photographs, without indicating her name as the photographer.163 Photo-fit refers 
to a portrait, created by computer from the contested photographs. Defendants had created 
the photo-fit because there was no recent photograph of Natascha Kampusch until her 
first public appearance. Photo-fit represented the supposed image of her during the time 
of her release.164 
Ms Painer sought an order before the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, 
Vienna) that the defendants cease the reproduction and/or distribution of the contested 
photographs and the photo-fit without her consent and without indicating her as author.165 
She also sought an interlocutory injunction on which a ruling had been given by the 
highest court, the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) before the main 
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proceedings had ended.166 In the proceedings for the interlocutory injunction, the Oberster 
Gerichtshof held that the contested photograph was a photographic work protected by 
copyright.167 However, the production and publication of the contested photo-fit was 
considered as within the scope of free use, instead of being an adaptation, which did not 
require her consent.168 The question of whether the photo-fit was to be considered as free 
use or adaptation depended on the creative effort in the template, i.e. the original photo. 
The greater the creative effort in the template, less likely a free use would come in 
question.169 According to the approach taken by the Oberster Gerichtshof, in the case of 
a portrait photo the creator enjoys only a small degree of individual formative freedom, 
for which reason portrait photographs enjoy narrower copyright protection.170 In those 
circumstances, the referring court was seeking to ascertain whether the legal opinion 
taken by the Oberster Gerichtshof was compatible with the EU law.171 The referring court, 
the Handelsgericht Wien, referred four questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
For the sake of the argument about automatism and creativity, only the first part of 
the fourth question of the judgment will be discussed. The CJEU reformulated the 
referring court’s question as whether Ms Painer’s consent to publish the contested photo-
fit was not needed because the scope of protection for portrait photographs was restricted 
or non-existent due to minor degree of formative freedom allowed by such 
photographs.172 The question was firstly of whether Article 6 of Term Directive173 should 
be interpreted in a way that portrait photographs are protected by copyright under that 
provision.174 If yes, whether the protection was minor to that enjoyed by other works due 
to lack of formative freedom. This question was to be understood particularly in relation 
to Article 2(a) InfoSoc Directive governing right of reproduction.175 However, the 
examination will be further concentrated on the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 6 of the 
Term Directive.  
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Let us briefly address the Article 6 of Term Directive. Article 6 states that: 
Photographs which are original in the sense that they are the author's own intellectual 
creation shall be protected in accordance with Article 1. No other criteria shall be applied 
to determine their eligibility for protection. Member States may provide for the protection 
of other photographs. 
Article 1 regulates the duration of authors' rights. Photographs are mentioned individually 
due to the fact, that before harmonisation of Term Directive durations for protection in 
Member States varied significantly. For example, Berne Convention sets the minimum 
duration to 25 years for photographs. In Term Directive, photographs are considered 
copyrightable works and therefore granted the full harmonised term of protection, which 
is 70 years from the authors death.176 A photograph that fills the originality criteria laid 
down in Article 6 must necessarily be protected by copyright. However, it is left to 
Member States’ discretion to protect other photographs that do not cross the originality 
threshold by related rights.177  
The CJEU started to answer the question concerning the creativity of portrait 
photographs by noting that it had already decided in Infopaq that copyright is liable to 
apply only in relation to a subject-matter, such as a photograph, which is original in the 
sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation.178 Now the CJEU clarified this 
account further, with a reference to above mentioned Term Directive, saying that 
according to the recital 17 of Term Directive, ‘an intellectual creation is an author’s own 
if it reflects the author’s personality’.179 That is the case if: 
[ … ] the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by 
making free and creative choices (see, a contrario, Joined Cases C‑403/08 and C‑429/08 
Football Association Premier League and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 98).180 
According to the CJEU, author’s intellectual creation reflects the personality of the 
author, in line with personality theories. The CJEU also included a reference a contrario 
to the reasoning in Murphy regarding copyright protection for sport matches.181 Back 
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then, conclusion was that no copyright protection could be given to sport matches as these 
are subject to the rules of the game.182 The Court continued that the photographer, on the 
other hand, could make free and creative choices in several ways and at various points in 
production.183 By making those choices, the author of a portrait photograph can stamp the 
work created with his ‘personal touch’.184 In Painer, the CJEU considered that a 
photographer has sufficient freedom for creative choices: the photographer can choose 
the background, the subject’s pose and the lighting as well as the framing, the angle of 
view and the atmosphere created. When selecting the snapshot, the photographer can 
choose from a variety of developing techniques or use a computer software.185 The 
relevant aspect is not whether the photo is a portrait or other kind of photograph but 
whether the photograph is original.186 
On that point, the AG had taken the same stance. However, regarding author’s own 
intellectual creation, which reflects his personality, the AG adds that: 
[ … ] only human creations are therefore protected, which can also include those for which 
the person employs a technical aid, such as a camera.187 
Only human creations are protected, even if technical aid is being used. The AG continues 
that besides being a human creation, the photograph must be original in order to get 
copyright protection.188 That means that ‘the photographer utilizes available formative 
freedom and thus gives it originality’.189 This part of the AG’s deliberations did not end 
up in the actual decision by the Court, but it illuminates our problem in its 
conceptualization of creativity as an exclusively human category. Only if the subject-
matter lands inside that category, the question of originality will be addressed. In the case 
of a photo, this means that the photographer utilizes available formative freedom: freedom 
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to choose from different options.190 If we apply the reasoning visible in Infopaq and 
FAPL, this would mean options that do not necessarily define what the outcome will be. 
Therefore, it would not matter whether the work is created using technology if there is a 
possibility for human intervention, i.e. the process is not completely automatic as was the 
case in Infopaq.  
So far it has been observed that technological process is automated when humans 
cannot intervene, as was seen in Infopaq. However, humans can be part of technological 
processes. In Painer, a human in question deployed mechanical aid, a camera. Again, 
actions were not considered mechanical as photographers have substantial formative 
freedom in executing them. In addition to being able to intervene in technological process, 
the significant element appeared to be how much freedom the intervener has. When the 
photographers could make free choices, the actions expressed their personality and were 
thus original. With the next case, it is discussed what happens when technical aid is 
involved but possibility for free choices is narrow.  
2.2.5 Football Dataco: mechanical considerations 
In Case Football Dataco Ltd191 the reference was made in proceedings between ‘Football 
Dataco and Others’192 and ‘Yahoo and Others’193. The reference concerned intellectual 
property rights claimed by Football Dataco and Others over the English and Scottish 
football league fixture lists that are the lists of the games that a team is scheduled to play. 
The basic requirement of such lists is that a football league must play every other team 
once at the team’s home ground and once at the opponent’s home ground.194 Compilation 
of the said lists were to great extent a task of one Mr Thompson, who in his work used 
also a computer program. The procedure consisted of several stages. The first stage was 
the preparation of the Premier League fixture schedule and an outline fixture list for other 
leagues. This was done by employees of the leagues.195 The second stage was sending the 
clubs questionnaires prior to the fixing of the schedule. Then responses to these 
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questionnaires were analyzed.196 The third stage was undertaken by Mr Thompson. It 
comprised of two tasks, ‘sequencing’ and ‘pairing’. Sequencing aimed to achieve the 
perfect home-away sequence for every club, having regard to the so-called ‘golden 
rules’197, a series of organizational constraints and the requests made by the clubs.198 The 
‘golden rules’ for example included a rule that no club should have three consecutive 
home or away games or that in any sequence of five consecutive games, no club should 
have four home or four away games.199 Mr Thompson then produced a pairing grid on 
the basis of the requests made by the teams. He gradually inserted the names of the teams 
into the grid and attempted to resolve a maximum amount of problem cases until a 
satisfactory draft fixture list was completed. For that purpose, he used a computer 
program, to which he transferred information from the sequencing sheet and the pairing 
grid to produce a readable version of the fixture list.200 The final stage involved Mr 
Thompson working with employees of the professional leagues to review the content of 
the fixture lists. Review was carried out manually with the assistance of computer 
software to find solutions to outstanding problems.201 
Football Dataco and Others claimed in the proceedings that they owned a ‘sui 
generis’ right and a copyright to the English and Scottish football league fixture lists. 
Yahoo and Others did not accept that such rights exist in law, arguing that they were 
entitled to use the lists in the conduct of their business without having to pay financial 
compensation.202 The judge at first instance had held that fixture lists were eligible for 
copyright protection under Article 3 of Database Directive.203 The referring court, Court 
of Appeal of England and Wales, had doubts about this. Firstly, the referring court raised 
the question of whether the fixture lists were protectable by copyright under Article 3 of 
the Database Directive. Secondly, the referring court was uncertain whether copyright 
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protection could be granted under national conditions different from those set out in 
Article 3(1) of the Database Directive.204 
Let us visit the referring court’s question regarding interpretation of Article 3(1) of 
the Database Directive in more detail. Article 3(1) states that: 
In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation shall be 
protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their 
eligibility for that protection. 
Firstly, the question was whether the intellectual effort and skill of creating data should 
be excluded in connection with the application of that provision. Secondly, whether the 
‘selection or arrangement’ of the contents, within the meaning of that provision, includes 
adding important significance to a pre‑existing item of data. Thirdly, whether the notion 
of ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ within the meaning of that provision requires more 
than significant labour and skill from the author and, if so, what that additional 
requirement is.205 
A few words on the division between copyright and sui-generis protection. 
Copyright is not self-evident in the case of a database. At the end of the 20th century, the 
protection of data collections in the European Community was found to be very diverse 
and partially inadequate. Technological developments led to the need to change 
legislation, as it meant that databases could be copied quickly without deterioration and 
cost-efficiently.206 Prior to the Database Directive, the protection of databases was 
realised in several EU Member States by copyright. Alongside this, the Database 
Directive created a new kind of right – a sui generis right – to provide protection also for 
databases that do not come under copyright protection because they were not original 
enough to achieve the level of work.207 The sui generis right has been heavily criticized 
and soon after the directive was adopted, its effects on the economy and the possible 
monopolization of information were noticed in legal literature.208 Sui generis right is 
applied when the threshold for copyright is too high; it protects the maker of a database 
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against exploitation of their financial contribution, not the originality of the work.209 In 
Football Dataco Ltd, the question was particularly about whether copyright protection 
would apply and for now we only need to know that copyright threshold was considered 
high for databases. To obtain copyright, database would have to express, by reason of the 
selection or arrangement of their contents, the author’s own intellectual creation.  
Then to the judgment. Again, the CJEU raised its own previous judgments rather 
than the Database Directive to discuss the originality of fixture lists. Referring to Infopaq, 
FAPL and Painer, the CJEU concluded that for databases, the criterion of originality is 
satisfied when its author expresses his creative ability in an original manner by making 
free and creative choices and thus stamps his ‘personal touch’ through the selection or 
arrangement of the data which the database contains.210 However, the criterion is not 
satisfied when the setting up of a database is dictated by technical considerations, rules 
or constraints which leave no room for creative freedom.211 The fact that the setting up 
of the database requires significant labour and skill on the part of its author cannot as such 
justify the protection of it by copyright, if that labour and skill do not express any 
originality in the selection or arrangement of that data.212 The CJEU concluded that a 
database within the meaning of Database Directive is protected by the copyright when 
creative freedom of author is expressed.213 
In his opinion, the AG had elaborated this a bit further, by noting that copyright 
protection requires creativity: 
[ … ] copyright protection is conditional upon the database being characterised by a 
‘creative’ aspect, and it is not sufficient that the creation of the database required labour 
and skill.214 
Hard work is not enough for copyright protection to be granted. The AG also brought up 
differences in the scope of protection when it comes to common law countries and 
continental systems, emphasizing that continentally copyright is essentially about 
creativity and personality: 
[ … ] in countries of the continental tradition, for a work to be protected by copyright it 
must generally possess a creative element, or in some way express its creator’s personality, 
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even though any assessment as to the quality or the ‘artistic’ nature of the work is always 
excluded.215 
The AG continued that the Directive espouses a concept of originality which requires 
more than the mere mechanical effort that is needed to collect the data and to enter them 
in the database.216 In that regard, the AG referred to the Court’s established doctrine that 
a work is an intellectual creation if it reflects the personality of its author, which is the 
case if the author was able to make free and creative choices in the production of the 
work. This was not the case in Football Dataco. As the AG stated, the CJEU has further 
specified that the necessary originality will be absent if the features of a work are 
predetermined by its technical function.217 However, mechanical efforts are relevant in 
application of sui generis right.218  
I believe the term ‘mechanical’ can be given a broader meaning here: activity that 
follows rules or is otherwise constrained is mechanical whether actual machine is used or 
not. Both the CJEU and especially the AG held concepts such as ‘personality’ and 
‘creativity’ in strong contrast with ‘mechanical’. Personality was expressed when ‘free 
and creative choices’ could be made. In this sense, if the means determine the outcome 
the CJEU will regard actions unoriginal and copyright protection will not be granted. This 
way, also human actions are not necessarily original but furthermore, they can be 
mechanical. 
2.2.6 Conclusion 
The question here was to find out what kind of actions the CJEU considers mechanic, as 
a counterpart for creativeness. In the beginning, the mechanical rat moving inside a maze 
was discussed. The question was posed whether similar setting might be at hand in the 
CJEU’s interpretations on automation. Now we have seen that something alike might be 
emerging from case material.  
Let us first discuss cases Infopaq and FAPL. In Infopaq, the CJEU concluded that 
prints of 11 word extracts were not transient copies as their destruction was dependent on 
human will. Therefore, the process could not be considered automated: it was possible 
that prints would not be destroyed after all. In FAPL, the outcome was other way around. 
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As the case concerned ephemeral signals inside satellite decoder box, of which humans 
were not even aware of, the question of automation was evaluated differently. In FAPL, 
the process was considered automated as humans could not intervene. However, an 
opposite interpretation was seen in the same case when the CJEU considered actions of 
pub owners and whether those were to be considered as communicating works to the 
public. In this regard, it was emphasized that pub owners knowingly decided to provide 
access to protected works. Therefore, their actions were not just of mechanical nature but 
a prerequisite for public to be able to enjoy the works. This way, if pub owners’ actions 
were not just mechanical, maybe they were the opposite. Maybe those actions were 
precisely human. As a final notion the CJEU’s understanding of the rules guiding the 
actions was discussed. The CJEU then concluded that football matches were not works 
in the meaning of copyright as they were subject to rules of the game. Therefore, it was 
not possible to exercise freedom of choice and thus be original.    
In cases Painer and Football Dataco the question of free choice was again 
elaborated. In Painer, the CJEU concluded with a reference to FAPL that actions guided 
by rules are not creative. In FAPL, such constraints were rules of the game. However, in 
Painer similar effect was not brought up by use of a technical aid, a camera. Even though 
Ms Painer was using a camera to take certain type of photographs, she nevertheless had 
a chance to make several creative choices: freely choose between different options. This 
way, freedom of choice brought along personality. As Ms Painer was able to choose, also 
the work was seen to reflect her personality. In Football Dataco the situation was 
different. Again the question of rules was revisited. Although Mr Thompson’s work with 
fixture lists required skill and labour it could not be considered creative similarly as Ms 
Painer’s photographs. This was because fixture lists were made based on certain rules, 
which dictated to outcome. Therefore, Mr Thompson could not exercise creative freedom 
putting together the lists.  
In Football Dataco, the AG and the CJEU appeared to throw against each other the 
concepts of ‘artistic’ and ‘mechanical’. It was further concluded that originality reflecting 
the author’s personality was tied to these kind of artistic, creative actions. Copyright is 
about creativity, not mechanical work, even though that work might be hard. Cases Painer 
and Football Dataco interestingly imply the traditional thinking of personality theory, 
linked to inspiration, creation and authorship. As it has been previously mentioned, 
creativity is usually considered to be exclusively human category. In this sense, it is 
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interesting that while Football Dataco strongly reflects these traditional modes of 
thinking, the conclusion was not that humans are always creative. Instead, in Football 
Dataco, the human was considered to act mechanically, similarly to a machine. 
Let us finally return to the image of a mechanical rat in the maze. The rat navigated 
in the maze based on inputs produced by the environment: if it could not move left, it 
moved right. In this example the automation was seen in the way which all kind of 
creativity and element of surprise was removed from the equation. The rat operated like 
a computer, which it of course was. A question posed in the beginning was whether 
similar reasoning could be applied to humans in the context of copyright. The question 
was then approached via personality theory, asking if there is some fundamentally human 
element of creativity that could be made visible from the praxis of the CJEU. The answer 
is yes and no. The Court indeed appeared to reconstruct this kind of element: freedom of 
choice, which was produced through concepts of freedom from rules and personal stamp. 
This way, it could be said that it is precisely freedom of choice that lays in the heart of 
humanity in the Court’s praxis. However, humans did not have exclusive right to this 
freedom after all. In Infopaq, the humans were parts of the machine and in Football 
Dataco humans acted like machines themselves. Freedom of choice belonged to humans 
but not all humans. If we now move from personality theory to posthumanist thought, the 
traditional questions have been borders between human and non-human as well as 
movements and fluidity of those borders. In the cases, these were not visible in a way that 
machines would resemble humans. Instead, machine and automation represented 
something precisely non-human if we consider humanity and creativity interconnected. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the movement of borders became visible among humans: in the 
way, some humans were creative and some were machine-like.  
2.3 Medium 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Previously a question was posed: are borders of humans and machines becoming 
increasingly ambiguous? This is also a well-known starting point in the conversations 
concerning posthumanist thought. For example, Jannice Käll argues in her dissertation 
that several examples of development of digital technology could be understood also as 
development that makes it increasingly difficult to separate between persons and 
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things.219 Interpreting Rosi Braidotti she adds that it is this ‘condition of obfuscated 
boundaries between human and technology’ that constitutes ‘posthuman condition’.220 
Several other theorists have discussed the idea of intertwining machines and organisms 
as well. For example, Donna Haraway states in her Cyborg Manifesto that ‘by the late 
twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated 
hybrids of machine and organism—in short, cyborgs.’221 Haraway describes the way in 
which machines and organisms have been previously separated by strict borders. 
However, those borders can be, and are being, confused.222 Could we consider that the 
examples presented in the beginning, the monkey-selfie, AI Rembrandt and robot-
samurai, are these kind of cyborgs or chimeras? As peculiar creatures that do not appear 
to belong self-evidently either among humans or technology. Could something like that 
be seen from the case material of this study? 
In the previous section, it was observed that certain fluidity appeared to exist 
between humanity and machinery. However, this did not mean human-like machines but 
rather understanding humans as machine-like. Sometimes the CJEU seemed to describe 
humans similar to machines: humans did not always act creatively but could act 
mechanically. Does this mean that the hypotheses presented now and in the beginning of 
this thesis, that it has become indeed more difficult to separate humans from machines, 
holds true? Again, the answer is not that clear. Assuming that a ‘posthuman’, ‘cyborg’ or 
‘hybrid’ is indeed something that consists of both human and machine, and meanings 
attached to these categories, it appeared that the CJEU was doing exactly the opposite: 
not hybridizing the qualities, but analysing them apart. The distinction between human 
and technology seemed after all quite strict. Even though humans could sometimes form 
parts of technological processes, these occasions were singled out without indicating any 
fundamental problem with regard to the nature of humanity. At any event, it did not 
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appear difficult for the Court to determine where the boundaries between humans and 
machines go, at least when it comes to physical boundaries. 
In this section, the way in which the Court maintains the difference between 
humanity and technology and its implications are further discussed. What is this 
seemingly clear separation of humans and machines like and if such separation does exist, 
is there a way to mediate it? The starting point is the conclusion of the previous section. 
There was a difference between humans and machines, but that difference was 
constructed among humans: humans could sometimes act like machines. This section then 
asks, what is that difference like when placed between humanity and technology? Instead 
of considering humans and technology intertwined, could we understand them as separate 
‘systems’, nevertheless able to communicate with each other somehow? Returning to our 
example, the mechanical rat was supposed to transform information processes into action 
that could be observed. Could we think that something alike might be happening in these 
cases as well? If technology and humanity are clearly separate from each other, what 
needs to happen in order for certain technological subject-matter to cross that border and 
enter the system of humanity and law? In other words, how does the ‘sphere of 
technology’ become observable to humans?  
2.3.2 Infopaq: ‘sphere of computer world’ 
To begin with, let us return to the Infopaq case. In Infopaq, the CJEU concluded that 
copyright within the meaning of Article 2(a) of InfoSoc Directive was liable to apply in 
relation to a subject-matter that is original in the sense that it is ‘its author’s own 
intellectual creation’.223 According to the CJEU, it could not be ruled out that such 
originality could be expressed by the extract of 11 words.224 Having established that an 
extract of 11 words from a text could this way constitute the latter’s ‘reproduction in part’, 
on the condition that the extract includes an element of the original author’s own 
intellectual creation,225 the CJEU then moved on to consider the exemptions from 
copyright given in Article 5(1) of InfoSoc Directive.    
The first conditions that may constitute an exemption according to Article 5(1) are 
that the reproduction must be temporary, transient or incidental. The Court defined that 
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reproduction could be held ‘transient’ only if ‘its duration is limited to what is necessary 
for the proper completion of the technological process.’226 This meant that the process 
must be automated so that the reproduction was automatically destroyed once its function 
had come to an end, without human intervention.227 This was not the case with the 
printing of 11 words, as destroying the printed paper was dependent on human 
intervention. However, regarding the first two acts of reproduction, the creation of image 
and text files, the CJEU could not rule out the possibility that those could be ‘transient’. 
That would have been the case if the files were automatically deleted from the computer 
memory.228 The reason why the first two acts might be exempted and the act of printing 
would not was according to the CJEU as follows: 
It is common ground, however, that, by the last act of reproduction in the data capture 
process, Infopaq is making a reproduction outside the sphere of computer technology. 
It is printing out files containing the extracts of 11 words and thus reproduces those extracts 
on a paper medium.229 
What does is it mean that something is being done ’outside the sphere of computer 
technology’? Some clarification to that issue can be found from the preamble of InfoSoc 
Directive. At first, recital 5 notes that ways of creation, production and exploitation have 
multiplied and diversified due technological development.230 While new legislation is not 
necessary, this progress creates a need for the copyright legislation to adapt. Recital 33 
of the preamble then elaborates that, for example, certain acts of reproduction are 
necessary for the functioning of technology.231 This is also why they should be exempt 
from the copyright protection:232 mandatory authorisation from the rightsholder would 
hinder the development of technology. Earlier this type of exemption was not needed as 
all copies were permanent in a way that their destruction was dependent on human 
decision.233 In other words, all copies belonged to the world governed by human will and 
choice.  
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Today however, this situation is different. Copies exist which are necessary for the 
functioning of technology. For humans these have the role of enabling something else to 
happen: often these kinds of reproductions, such as caching, are not something that 
humans could enjoy as such. In a way, they remain invisible for regular users. At the point 
where humans become able to enjoy the reproductions, to see or hear them, their 
copyright evaluation might be different. This kind of stance is visible in Infopaq where 
the CJEU considered that reproductions created, staying and deleted inside computer 
memory could potentially fulfil the exemption conditions of Article 5(1).234 The same did 
not apply to the prints of 11 word extracts.235 While the Court acknowledged that the facts 
provided by referring court were not sufficient to fully evaluate whether the erasure of 
files from computer memory was automated in all aspects,236 there was no doubt that 
destruction of the prints of the extracts was not automated. They were produced outside 
‘computer sphere’ and among humans.  
As a final observation, let us revisit the AG’s interpretation of Article 5(1). The AG 
explains the purpose of Article 5(1):  
[ … ] the purpose of Article 5(1) is to exclude [from copyright protection] temporary acts 
of reproduction ‘which technology dictates’.237 
If an act of reproduction is dictated by technology, Article 5(1) can be applied. Let us 
consider what the AG says here together with what the Court set up as the ‘common 
ground’ in the above citation. Firstly, there is a ‘sphere of computer technology’ which 
has an outside. Then what stands as the outside of that sphere? Relying on the CJEU’s 
definition of automation as consisting of acts independent of human intervention (i.e., 
acts are not automated or mechanical to the extent that they were chosen freely) it would 
be easy to conclude that what represents the ‘outside’ for technology is the world of 
humans. Previously, it was suggested that the CJEU’s interpretation of automation was 
that it involves acts that are independent of human intervention. But could we also make 
a more detailed suggestion? Insofar as the ‘outside’, as explained by the Court in the first 
citation, is among humans where paper is printed and its destruction is dependent on 
human intervention, is the ‘inside’ of technology then something that ‘technology 
dictates’? Insofar the Court means to say, not only that the technological environment 
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simply needs certain things to happen in order to facilitate its proper functioning, but also 
that technology so much as ‘dictates’ the way in which things will have to be, can we not 
find some hazy traces at least of the more critical understanding of technology, according 
to which technology is someplace where humans cannot exercise freedom of choice? Let 
us explore the implications of this division a bit further with the next case. 
2.3.3 FAPL: transient fragments and ephemeral signals 
The distinction between human and technology is further clarified in case FAPL. In 
FAPL, the questions referred to the Court concerned firstly the issue of whether the 
reception of Premier League football matches and the associated works constituted 
‘reproductions’ within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a television screen.238 As 
has been discussed previously, the referring court asked, whether reproduction right 
extends to transient sequential fragments of works, produced inside the memory of a 
satellite decoder and on a television screen and whether those fragments should be 
evaluated as one or independently when they appear.239 In case transient sequential 
fragments constituted a reproduction, would those reproductions belong to the scope of 
Article 5(1) of InfoSoc Directive and be therefore exempted from copyright owner’s 
authorisation. Secondly, the questions concerned the issue of whether pub operators who 
used such satellite decoders were ‘communicating the works to the public’ by showing 
them on a television screen in their public houses.240  
Regarding the scope of copyright in the technological context of Article 2(a) of the 
InfoSoc Directive, the CJEU stated that the reproduction right extends to transient 
fragments of the works if they contain elements, which are the expression of the authors’ 
own intellectual creation.241 To determine whether such expression is contained, the 
fragments reproduced simultaneously were to be examined together.242 Therefore, the 
CJEU did not consider it impossible that transient fragments within satellite decoder 
could carry the expression of author’s intellectual creation. Final answer to this question 
was left for the national court to give.243 
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 Should the national court find that transient fragments of works come within the 
concept of reproduction, evaluating the conditions of exemption from copyright in Article 
5(1) of InfoSoc Directive would become relevant. Regarding the application of Article 
5(1), the CJEU concluded that it was undisputed that the first three conditions were 
fulfilled: reproductions in case FAPL could be considered as temporary, transient and 
being an integral part of technological process.244 As has been discussed previously, also 
the fourth condition (lawful use) was fulfilled.245 Let us again raise the CJEU’s interesting 
notion regarding the fifth condition, independent economic significance. According to the 
CJEU: 
[ … ], the temporary acts of reproduction, carried out within the memory of the satellite 
decoder and on the television screen, form an inseparable and non-autonomous part of the 
process of reception of the broadcasts transmitted containing the works in question. 
Furthermore, they are performed without influence, or even awareness, on the part 
of the persons thereby having access to the protected works.246 
Therefore, the reproductions produced within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a 
television screen fulfilled all the conditions laid down in Article 5(1) InfoSoc. Such acts 
may be carried out without the authorisation of the rightsholders.247 This much has been 
already observed. Previously it was concluded that the fact that users were not aware of 
the acts of reproduction lead to a situation where humans could not make free choices. 
But in relation to the issues of this section, we might ask, how come were the users not 
aware of these acts?  
Let us take a short recap on what kind of actions were in question. Premier League 
organised the filming of football matches, which were usually filmed by the BBC or Sky. 
Films went through several phases. Logos and commentary were added, after which the 
films were compressed, encrypted and transmitted via satellite to subscribers. Subscribers 
could then decrypt and decompress the signal with a decoder device.248 As a result, 
fragments of works (such as films, musical works and sound recordings) were 
sequentially stored in the decoder prior to their output.249 Four frames existed in the 
memory buffer at one time, together with a short soundtrack corresponding to the 
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frames.250 Similarly, an image was displayed on the screen, although for an even shorter 
time, while the corresponding section of the soundtrack was played.251  
The guests of a public house appear to be not aware of these acts as these take place 
‘inside’ technology, but would they not be aware of the image displayed on television 
screen? Regarding the fifth condition of Article 5(1), independent economic significance, 
the AG indeed draws a distinction between acts that occur inside the decoder device and 
on the television screen. According to the AG, all conditions of Article 5(1) are meant to 
permit acts purporting to facilitate actual exploitation.252 If an act of reproduction with a 
view to transmission does not occur, exploitation at the end of the transmission chain is 
not possible.253 Therefore, reproductions produced inside the decoder device would have 
no independent economic significance.254 However, the AG considered that 
reproductions on television screen would have that. According to the AG, ‘the economic 
significance of a broadcast is, as a rule, based on its reception.’255 
The CJEU eventually decided that neither the reproductions inside decoder’s 
memory nor on television screen had independent economic significance, as fulfilment 
of that condition would require economic advantage beyond mere reception of the 
broadcasts.256 In other words, as works broadcast have economic value, the access to them 
necessarily has value as well. However, this kind of value is not independent in a way 
that it would create additional value.257 Still, the division drafted by the AG is 
illuminating in terms of the CJEU’s statement regarding user’s awareness. From this, we 
may infer that acts that a user is not aware of are also acts that take place within the 
satellite decoder device. However, on television screen there appears to be two things 
happening. On the other hand, there is the technological process of which the images on 
screen form part. This was considered non-autonomous: belonging to the ‘sphere of 
technology’. Then again, the transient images as a whole formed a video of what humans 
understood to be a football match. How did this technological process produce something 
understandable to humans? Let us take a look at this issue next. 
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 This question relates to the Court’s second inquiry. The referring court asked 
whether ‘communication to the public’ covers transmission of the broadcast works, via a 
television screen and speakers, to the customers present in a public house.258 The CJEU 
started its evaluation by clarifying the concept of ‘communication’. Referring to Related 
Rights Directive and TRIPS Agreement259, the Court concluded that ‘communication’ 
should cover ‘making the sounds or representations of sounds fixed in a phonogram 
audible to the public’.260 The Court also raised Article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne 
Convention, stating that: 
[the] concept encompasses communication by loudspeaker or any other instrument 
transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, covering […] a means of communication such as 
display of the works on a screen.261 
What appears to be listed here, are ways of communication that humans can not only 
understand but use to communicate with each other.  As discussed in previous section, 
the actions of pub owners could not be considered just technical means merely to ensure 
or improve the reception of the original broadcast. Instead, those actions were the very 
requirement for the audience to be able to view the broadcast in the first place. In a way, 
broadcast works are around us all the time: we just cannot observe them without aid. We 
need something that transforms the signals into an understandable form. The CJEU 
explains this further: 
[…] the proprietor of a public house intentionally gives the customers present in that 
establishment access to a broadcast containing protected works via a television screen and 
speakers. Without his intervention the customers cannot enjoy the works broadcast, even 
though they are physically within the broadcast’s catchment area.262 
Therefore, the CJEU concluded that when broadcast works are intentionally transmitted 
via a television screen and speakers, those acts constitute ‘a communication to the 
public’.263 In addition to the bar owners’ intentions, a relevant aspect would appear to be 
the ‘translation’ of signals to a format the audience is able to perceive with their senses, 
by hearing and seeing in particular.264 Without that intervention the customers cannot 
enjoy the works broadcast, even though they are physically within the broadcast’s 
catchment area. The intervention of the owner is therefore not only manifestation of his 
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will. By intervening, he also provides the audience with a medium to the technological 
world of signals, by equipment that translates the signals and transient fragments 
produced inside the satellite decoder box to a format that the audience can understand. 
Let us compare this case to the case of Infopaq. In Infopaq, what happens at the end 
of the process, i.e. whether prints were destroyed or not, was dependent on human will. 
Therefore, the process was not considered automated in all aspects. The CJEU also noted 
that print existed in material form, which was one of the reasons why it, according to the 
CJEU, could not be automatically destroyed. Automatically then meant without human 
intervention. On the other hand, that kind of automatic destroying was possible when it 
took place inside the technological process. In FAPL, the evaluation was in this respect 
different. Acts of reproduction took place inside the black box of technology, the satellite 
decoder. While the CJEU concluded that also parts of a work produced inside the decoder 
box constituted reproductions, authorisation of the rightsholder would not be necessary 
as all the conditions of exemption in Article 5(1) InfoSoc Directive were fulfilled. This 
was because humans could not interfere and were not even aware of the process.  
However, when the ephemeral signals and transient fragments ‘on the air’ were 
transformed into a format that humans could understand by hearing or seeing, something 
happened. While the exemptions in Article 5(1) applied to the technological process of 
the FAPL case, its evaluation under Article 3(1) governing ‘communication to the public’ 
was different. If we consider that notion as it was presented in the previous case, where 
the CJEU appeared to draw a division between the ‘sphere of computer technology’ and 
the human world, could we think that in the present case that borderline was crossed 
somehow? And furthermore, that it was done by transforming the signals that belong to 
the technological world – and are therefore exempt from the application of Article 5(1) – 
into something that belongs to humanity? Could we think that by that act of 
transformation, the signals and fragments were given a meaning among humans? But 
what then is that meaning, more precisely? This will be discussed with the next case. 
2.3.4 SAS Institute Inc.: acts of translation 
Case SAS again brings to light some further distinctions between the human and the 
machine. The references for the CJEU were made by a British court in the proceedings 
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between SAS Institute Inc. (SAS Institute) and World Programming Ltd.265 The case 
concerned analytical software developed by SAS Institute. Software known as SAS 
System was used particularly in statistical analysis. The SAS System included a core 
component that enabled users to write and run application programs to work with their 
data. Such applications were written in a language known as SAS Language.266 When 
customers had acquired a license to SAS System, they were bound to use SAS 
components in order to run their existing application programs in SAS language.267 The 
World Programming Ltd had then created an alternative computer program, the World 
Programming System, which enabled users to run programs written in SAS language.268 
World Programming Ltd had admitted that its intention was to produce the same kind of 
functionality as in SAS System, so that the programs of its customers would function 
similarly.269 However, it had not been established that World Programming Ltd would 
have copied the text of the SAS System’s source code or its structural design.270  
The national courts handling the case on its previous stages had held that it was not 
an infringement of copyright to study how the program functions and, based on these 
observations, to write another program that emulates the functionality of the first 
program.271 SAS Institute disagreed and brought the case before the referring court, The 
High Court of Justice of England and Wales.272 For the sake of the argument, the analysis 
will be limited to the first question of the reference. This question, as reformulated by the 
EU Court, concerned the copyright protection for the functionality of a computer 
program, the programming language and the format of data files, i.e., whether those 
constitute ‘a form of expression’ of the program in terms of Article 1(2) of the Software 
Directive.273   
Let us first revisit the Software Directive in a bit more detail. Article 1(1) states 
that: 
In accordance with the provisions of this Directive, Member States shall protect computer 
programs, by copyright, as literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention for 
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the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. For the purposes of this Directive, the term 
‘computer programs’ shall include their preparatory design material. 
The wording clearly articulates that computer programs are protected within the copyright 
system, instead of other intellectual property regimes.274 Secondly, computer programs 
are protected as ‘literary works’ within the meaning of Berne Convention. This means 
that computer programs are not to be categorized as, for example, applied art. Also the 
minimum requirements of Berne Convention apply similarly to computer programs as to 
other literary works.275 Article 1(2) of the Software Directive then states that: 
Protection in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the expression in any form of a 
computer program. Ideas and principles which underlie any element of a computer 
program, including those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under 
this Directive. 
This Article expresses the well-established principle in the field of copyright law: 
copyright should protect expressions, not ideas.276 Simplified, it could be said that 
protection is afforded to the form and not the content.277 For example, it is possible for 
several persons to paint a picture of the same theme: it is the way in which that theme is 
expressed that is the subject of copyright protection and not the theme itself.278 However, 
this approach has proven difficult in the context of computer programs due to the 
computer program’s dualistic nature as both literary and functional.279 While 
programming language resembles other language systems, difficulties emerge from its 
potential to create actual effects in the world of human experience. This functional 
element is not found from other literary works: if functionality is understood as analogous 
to an idea, it could be said that an idea is an essential part of a computer program.280 This 
connection between every program’s existence in the ‘world of technology’ and the 
‘world of humanity’ requires that the courts distinguish the idea from its expression in 
order to evaluate whether a computer program can be given copyright protection. 
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Then to the evaluation of the mentioned questions. Let us begin with the AG’s 
Opinion. Regarding the referring court’s question of copyright protection for computer 
language, the AG begins: 
[ … ] a computer program is first compiled in the form of a source code. That code is 
written in a programming language which will act as a translator between the user and the 
computer. It enables the user to write instructions in a language that he himself 
understands.281 
’Computer program’ can be understood as set of instructions given to the computer: the 
programmer wants the computer to perform certain tasks. These instructions are given in 
the form of code.282 The code that the programmer initially writes is the source code, 
which resembles natural language, usually English.283 The source code is the only part of 
the code that can be understood by humans.284 The object code, on the other hand, is a 
sequence of electrical charges which is not dependent on a written representation.285 A 
so-called ‘compiler’ is needed to translate source code into machine-readable object 
code.286 This marks the border between ‘human world’ and ‘world of technology’. The 
language of computer needs to be translated into a form that humans can understand (and 
vice versa.) Similar observation was previously made in relation to transient images, 
which were translated into sounds and a picture on television screen.  
Previously, a question was posed, whether the act of taking something from the 
‘world of technology’ and carrying it over to humans meant that something was given a 
meaning among humans. Could we now think that perhaps this is what meaning stands 
for? That meaning is something the humans themselves understand? Natural language is 
no doubt this kind of construct. The foundation of language is a shared form of life, which 
again leads to shared meanings.287 The acts discussed here (football match, its 
commentary and the writing of source code) are such that we humans can understand 
them but they would appear incomprehensible to animals or even to machines. This way, 
perhaps we could think that what defines the ‘human world’ alongside freedom is 
meaning. This is good as far as it goes, but what then defines the ‘world of technology’?  
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Let us still stay with the AG’s Opinion and have a look at the way it answered to 
the question of whether the functionalities of a program could obtain copyright protection. 
The AG clarified the meaning of functionality in a computer program by defining it as 
the set of possibilities offered by a computer system: the functionality of a computer 
program is the service which the user expects from it.288 Therefore, the AG considers that 
functionalities of a computer program cannot be the object of copyright protection.289 The 
AG explains this with an example: 
Where a programmer decides to develop a computer program for airline ticket reservations, 
that software will contain a multitude of functionalities needed to make a booking. The 
computer program will have to be able, in turn, to find the flight requested by the user, 
check availability, book the seat, register the user’s details, take online payment details 
and, finally, edit the user’s electronic ticket. All of those functionalities, those actions, are 
dictated by a specific and limited purpose.290 
Firstly, it is the programmer who decides to develop a computer program and thus defines 
its purposes. What the machine does is enable that purpose to be realized. Those kind of 
actions cannot be creative as they are dictated by ‘a specific and limited’ purpose. What 
the AG appears to say is that technology is instrumental. If we at this point take a look 
back to our paradigmatic image, the mechanical rat-in-a-labyrinth, perhaps we can realize 
what is crucial here: the purpose of the actions in the case of machines is pre-defined and 
it is because of this fact the they cannot belong to the scope of copyright protection. But 
it is not so that machines could never set the purpose. On the contrary, technology can 
dictate the way in which things have to be, as was implied by the AG in case Infopaq. 
Back then, the AG stated that ‘the purpose of Article 5(1) is to exclude temporary acts of 
reproduction ‘which technology dictates.’291 If the purpose of the action is derived from 
machines instead of humans, those actions cannot be protected by copyright. Whereas 
copyright is about human freedom, machinery is about instrumental service.  
2.3.5 Conclusion 
The answer to the question whether technology and humanity intertwine in the praxis of 
the CJEU appears to be no. Both the CJEU and the AG appeared to place a strict division 
between what is human and what is machine. Previously, it was observed that freedom of 
choice served as this kind division between human and machine: freedom belonged to 
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humans and service belonged to machines. In this section this division was further 
examined. It further appeared that the CJEU and the AG were conceptualizing ‘humanity’ 
and ‘machinery’ as different ‘worlds’: when something happened among machines it 
could lead to the actualization of the exemptions of Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
Actions that took place among machines could therefore be exempt from copyright 
protection, which is for humans. This division was made via freedom of choice but also 
other elements. 
In all cases objects appeared that seemed to belong to the ‘world of technology’: 
those were signals, file formats and object code. These were out of reach for humans as 
such. The reason why they appeared to belong to machine instead of human was that to 
all these an aspect of ‘translation’ was attached. Signals had to be translated into picture 
and sound, file formats needed to be translated into words on a paper and code needed to 
be in a form that humans could read. What happened in this act of translation was that 
these objects were given a meaning among humans: they were transformed into means 
that humans could use to communicate and interact with each other. 
Could humans not communicate with technology then? In a way yes, but this kind 
of communication was not characterized by freedom, as with humans. The machines 
could be given different kind of instructions and orders, but it would be unthinkable that 
machine would suddenly question these. The machines in general do not stop and ask: 
what is the point? Whereas freedom was for humans, the instrumentality was for 
machines. The purpose of technology was to enable pre-defined purposes of humans. 
When the purpose was not set by humans, these actions were excluded from copyright 
protection. On this basis it seems we can conclude that copyright is indeed centred around 
human subject. But could there also be something more to that? In the previous section it 
was concluded that the division between human and machine could also be found within 
the humans themselves. Perhaps there lies some sort of fundamental fear regarding our 
own humanity: what if we are not creative and free, but unable to determine meaning and 
purpose for ourselves, and therefore not humans at all? Maybe this strict division between 
mechanical and creative is necessary precisely to safeguard our humanity and maybe we 
exclude machines to exclude the machine in us. With the next section we will take a look 
at this possible division within the human subject. 
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2.4 Rationality 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Where are we now? We have observed humanity in relation to automation as well as in 
relation to technology in more general. We noted that when humans were not able to 
exercise their freedom to make choices, they could be considered as parts of technological 
processes and their actions could be understood as mechanical rather than creative. But 
when there was a possibility for human intervention, the evaluation was different. 
However, this did not appear to imply that the so-called borders between humanity and 
technology would become increasingly fluid: rather the observations in the previous 
section pointed to the opposite direction. The CJEU seemed to draw a strict distinction 
between humanity and technology. When something happened among technology, it lead 
to the copyright protection, which is for humans, not applying. Then again, for something 
to cross the border required that this something received a meaning among humans via 
an act of translation. In addition, whereas free choice was associated with humanity, 
technology was given a role in instrumental service.  
This way, two distinctions have been examined which appear to demarcate the 
world of human experience. The first one, which operated via the notion of freedom, was 
drawn within humanity. The second one, operated via the notion of meaning, was drawn 
between humanity and technology. At the end of the previous section a question was 
posed: is there something foreign in ourselves that does not comply with these categories 
constitutive of humanity (freedom and meaning) and which we therefore have to exclude 
to preserve our humanity? Reminding ourselves of the mechanical rat presented in the 
beginning, should we consider ourselves as the ones who set the purpose for the actions 
of the rat or are we the rat? Can we make free decisions? This final distinction will be 
approached via one more fundamental human feature: that of a rational thought. 
The tradition of western philosophy has included a tendency to understand things 
in comparison to something that they are not. For example, social reality is not nature. 
Nature exists regardless of our social constructs. In a similar way, human is not an animal. 
Humans can make choices in a way animals cannot. Animals make choices too, but 
choices of animals are not rational in the same sense as human choices. Whereas humans 
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act out of reason, animals act out of instinct.292 One element of these dichotomies is often 
their hierarchical order: reason is valued over instinct and human is valued over nature.  
For example, according to the interpretation by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, 
in European history the ideal of human presents itself in the distinction to animal and the 
irrationality of an animal is how humans prove their own value as rational beings.293 In 
the tradition of thought deriving from Enlightenment, humanity is understood as an area 
of rational freedom, to which animal presents a border or counterforce.294 
This order is also a foundation for Freud’s theory of three traumas.295 First trauma 
was the Copernican turn: Earth is not the centre of the universe. Second trauma ensued 
from the questioning of the hierarchy between humans and animals, implied in Darwin’s 
work. Humans descended from monkeys. Third trauma was introduced by Freud himself. 
According to Freud, humans acted out of rationality only to a very small extent. Instead, 
humans were directed by the sub-conscious, something that would forever be out of reach 
for rationalization.296 In the vein of posthumanist thought, Donna Haraway has then 
suggested adding the fourth trauma: that which infolds organic and technological flesh.297  
While that kind of hybdridazitation was not visible in the cases per se, could we 
find the final division between human and machine from the third trauma? The one inside 
the subject, where it emerges between rational thought and something that escapes 
rationalization? If we are to assume that within humanity there is something ‘other’, 
something that represents non-human, and that this ‘other’ needs to be excluded, what is 
the ‘other’ more precisely? Previously that otherness has been found from animals, but 
what kind of otherness do machines represent? This is the last question of this thesis. Let 
us take a look at this issue next.  
2.4.2 Levola Hengelo: on sufficiency and precision 
In Case C-310/17 Levola Hengelo, the request was made in the proceedings between 
Levola Hengelo BV (Levola) and Smilde Foods BV (Smilde) concerning an alleged 
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infringement by Smilde of Levola’s intellectual property rights relating to the taste of a 
food product. ‘Heksenkaas’ or ‘Heks’nkaas’ (‘Heksenkaas’) was a spreadable dip, which 
was created by a Dutch retailer of vegetables and fresh produce in 2007. By an agreement 
concluded in 2011 and in return for remuneration, its creator transferred his intellectual 
property rights over to Levola. Since January 2014 Smilde had been manufacturing a 
product called ‘Witte Wievenkaas’ for a supermarket chain in the Netherlands.298  
Levola took the view that the production and sale of Witte Wievenkaas infringed 
its copyright in the ‘taste’ of Heksenkaas and brought proceedings against Smilde before 
the Dutch Rechtbank Gelderland (Gelderland District Court).299 The Rechtbank 
Gelderland held that it was not necessary to rule on whether the taste of Heksenkaas was 
protectable under copyright law. In any event, Levola’s claims were to be rejected since 
it had not indicated which elements, or combination of elements, of the taste of 
Heksenkaas gave it its unique, original character and personal stamp.300 Levola appealed 
against that judgment before the referring court, the Dutch Gerechtshof Arnhem-
Leeuwarden (Regional Court of Appeal). The appellate court considered that the key issue 
in the case was whether the taste of a food product may be eligible for copyright 
protection.301 The appellate court referred this question to the CJEU, asking it whether 
InfoSoc Directive precludes the taste of a food product from being protected by copyright 
and the national legislation from being interpreted in such a way that it grants copyright 
protection to a taste.302  
Article 2(a) InfoSoc Directive states that the Member States are to provide for a set 
of exclusive rights for authors to their ‘works’. In Levola Hengelo the CJEU recalled its 
doctrine, stating that the concept of ‘work’ is an autonomous concept of Community 
legislation.303 In that regard, two cumulative conditions must be satisfied for a subject 
matter to be classified as a ‘work’ within the meaning of InfoSoc Directive. Firstly, as we 
have seen, the subject matter must be original in the sense that it is the author’s own 
intellectual creation. Secondly, only something which is the expression of the author’s 
own intellectual creation may be classified as a ‘work’.304 However, the Court leaved the 
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concept of ‘expression’ open to great extent, which has led some commentators to guess, 
whether the implication of this division will lead to de facto fixation-requirement in EU 
copyright law.305 Interpretative support for determining the EU law meaning of the 
concept of work along these lines was looked for from international treaties. Under 
Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention, ‘literary and artistic works include every production 
in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever the mode or form of its expression 
may be.’ According to Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty306 and Article 9(2) of 
TRIPS Agreement, copyright protection may be granted to expressions, but not to ideas, 
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.307  
This issue relates to the question of ‘subject-matter categories’, which has every 
now and then been discussed in the field of copyright. The adopted type of regulatory 
approach means that the subject-matter of copyright is defined by exclusive 
categorization.308 However, in principle European Union law does not recognize these 
kind of categories309: the wording ‘literary and artistic works’ in Berne Convention is to 
be interpreted broadly and the categories listed in it are more of examples.310 The Berne 
list makes no reference to tastes, or to works which are similar to tastes, such as scents or 
perfumes, but it does not exclude them expressly. Also, case Infopaq had indicated that 
all works regardless of their subject-matter can obtain copyright protection if they fulfil 
the originality criterion laid down in the decision.311 However, as Caterina Sganga points 
out, in case Painer the CJEU appeared to imply that the preliminary identification of the 
subject matter determines the subsequent protection.312  
If we now move to the CJEU’s evaluation in Levola Hengelo, we can first make the 
observation that the emphasis of the CJEU’s reasoning was on the notion of expression. 
According to the CJEU, the subject matter protected by copyright must be expressed in a 
                                                 
305 Caterina Sganga, The Notion of 'Work' in EU Copyright Law After Levola Hengelo: One Answer 
Given, Three Question Marks Ahead. E.I.P.R. 41(7) 2019, p.415-424, 421. 
306 WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996). 
307 Case C‑310/17 Levola Hengelo, para 39. 
308 Pamela Samuelson, Evolving conceptions of copyright subject matter. University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review 78/2016 p.17-93, 21-22.: Some countries have taken the approach in the Berne Convention with 
an open-ended list of ‘literary and artistic works’ as the subject matter of copyright. Other countries use 
specific types of subject matters eligible for copyright protection.  
309 See eg. Sganga (2019), p.421-422. 
310 Sganga (2019), p.415. 
311 C-5/08 Infopaq, para 37: ‘In those circumstances, copyright within the meaning of Article 2(a) of 
Directive 2001/29 is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that 
it is its author’s own intellectual creation.’ 
312 Sganga (2019), p.417. 
 60 
 
manner which makes it identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity, even though 
that expression does not necessarily have to take lasting form.313 The CJEU concluded 
that the taste of a food product could not be pinned down with precision and objectivity. 
Literary, pictorial, cinematographic or musical works are examples of a precise and 
objective form of expression.314 The taste of a food product, however, is identified 
essentially:  
[…] on the basis of taste sensations and experiences, which are subjective and variable 
since they depend, inter alia, on factors particular to the person tasting the product 
concerned, such as age, food preferences and consumption habits, as well as on the 
environment or context in which the product is consumed.”315 
Taste sensations were considered subjective, and therefore not adapt to contribute to 
formation of copyrightable subject-matter. In the proceedings, Smilde claimed that the 
protection of tastes is not consistent with the copyright system because it only consists of 
visual and aural creations.316 This indeed seems to be so. As observed in the previous 
section, if something happens in the ‘sphere of technology’ its contents need to be 
translated into understandable form, to be made visible or audible for humans. In SAS, 
this medium for translation was programming language and in FAPL, it was television 
screen and speakers. Especially the latter seems to point out that only certain of the senses 
are to be regarded responsive in this regard, those being vision and hearing. Turning to 
the AG, we can see him taking the same stance as the judges, noting in his opinion that 
the provision of Berne Convention regarding different categories of works refers only to 
works, which are perceived visually or aurally, such as books and musical 
compositions.317 Although the list is not exclusive as such, says the AG, it does exclude 
productions that may be perceived only by senses such as taste, smell or touch.318  
What does this mean then? At first, it no doubt follows already from the functioning 
of the legal system that legal concepts need to have a certain limited scope.319 Would not 
this in itself mean that concepts such as taste could not be legal and, consequently, that 
tastes could not constitute subject-matter of copyright law? This seems to be the 
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undertone in both the CJEU’s and the AG’s reasoning. Yet this question urges me to bring 
up something that has been remotely present in all of these cases. Law is not necessarily 
meant to correspond to what is ‘true’ in some unequivocal sense. There are plenty of 
objects and actions (or rather candidates for such) that can be introduced into legal system, 
although law cannot loyally replicate those elements of the ‘real world’.320 In terms of 
procedural law, what will be the decision of the court is initially based on the claims and 
evidence submitted by the parties, which mould the judgement. The judgement becomes 
a judicial truth although it is not necessarily the ‘truth itself’.321 Therefore, to allow 
copyright protection for taste is not ‘impossible’. Indeed, such actions regarding sensuous 
copyright have been taken nationally.322 
How about the recipe of the food product, could it not be enough to fulfil the 
condition of sufficient identification? As for example Andrew Christie writes: ‘Over time, 
the content of copyright works has evolved away from the symbolic and towards the 
sensual.’323 The CJEU and the AG would appear to prove against this kind of claim. 
Referring to the dichotomy between idea and expression, the AG stated that although the 
form in which a recipe is expressed may be protected by copyright where the expression 
is original, copyright does not protect the recipe as such as it relates to idea.324 Also the 
CJEU links the recipe to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts.325 Copyright protection cannot be granted on that basis. Interestingly, both the 
AG and the CJEU see an option that the conceptual vagueness of such evasive things as 
tastes can be done away with someday: with the aid of technology. This is elaborated in 
the AG’s opinion: 
It would seem that, based on today’s technology, the precise and objective identification 
of a taste or scent is currently impossible. […] An objective characterisation of such 
experiences does not yet exist. I do not rule out the possibility that techniques may be 
developed in the future to enable the precise and objective identification of a taste or a 
scent, which could lead to the legislature taking action to protect them using copyright, or 
other means.326 
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The CJEU agreed to this, noting that ‘it is not possible in the current state of scientific 
development to achieve by technical means a precise and objective identification of the 
taste of a food product which enables it to be distinguished from the taste of other products 
of the same kind.’327 Vague concepts such as taste cannot be defined precisely enough: 
they are too subjective. Technology, on the other hand, just might have this property. It 
might understand something about humans that humans cannot understand about 
themselves. 
Let us now return to Freud’s three traumas for a while and especially to the second 
one: the division between human and animal. As Jouni Teittinen notes, humans have 
throughout history reflected their essence in relation to animals, to the point, where 
categories of human and animal have become metaphysical categories instead of practical 
conceptualizations or taxonomical divisions.328 If we consider this separation analogous 
to the separation between machine and human, it appears that similar practice is visible 
in Levola Hengelo. Separation of human and non-human elements, the latter of which 
humans to some extent share with other beings, requires striking a division inside the 
mind of a human. Sub-conscious element of the human mind, the one that escapes 
rationalization, must according to these divisions belong to something ‘other’ than 
human. Humans act out of reason, animals act out of instinct. For something purely 
sensuous to enter the legal system is unthinkable, as it would mean recognizing the animal 
side of human. Similar point has been made by Christopher Buccafusco, who argues that 
the so-called sensory dichotomy in IP (between patents and copyright) reflects the sensory 
hierarchy in traditional Western aesthetic theory: according to this tradition, sight and 
hearing are ‘high’ senses capable of unconstrained aesthetic and cultural experiences. 
Touch, taste, and smell, by contrast, are ‘low’ senses because their connection to natural 
bodily needs constrains their aesthetic capacities.329 The ‘lower quality’ must be excluded 
to preserve the higher quality. Interestingly, as seen in the previous citation, technology 
does not bear this off-putting implication. On the contrary, in the future technology might 
just finally provide humans with a more precise and clear view of the otherness inside 
themselves.  
                                                 
327 Case C‑310/17 Levola Hengelo, para 43. 
328 Teittinen (2014), p.156. 
329 Christopher Buccafusco, Making sense of intellectual property law. Cornell Law Review 97/2012, p. 
501-548, 501. 
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If we continue for a moment with this analogy of animals, we can observe that 
animal represents instinct, something that relates to the sub-conscious rather than to clear 
reason. If this non-human element is purified, something fundamentally human emerges: 
a human of rational and free choices. It was also one of the products of Enlightenment 
that human cannot take his humanity as given, but instead must take responsibility for it 
by making use of his reason.330 If all else is excluded but reason remains, does it mean 
that we will this way finally find the core of humanity? Let us return to mechanical rat. If 
animal represents something non-rational, something that belongs to the world of senses 
and instinct, then how about the mechanical animal? It cannot really be said that the rat 
would have operated on instinct. In a way, the rat was utterly rational. It chose the best 
option based on the feedback it got from the system and this way navigated in the maze. 
If this type of rationalization is indeed at the core of humanity, it would seem that exactly 
that core we share with machines. 
2.4.3 Conclusion 
In this case, two things seem to happen. Firstly, while the decision of the CJEU has in 
general been accepted well331, it has sparked criticism as well. Sganga criticizes the 
Court’s decision for leaving an open-ended reference to ‘future technology’ to the 
judgment: ‘Last, but not the least problematic, the fact that the court links the potential 
future admissibility of sensory copyright to the evolution of technology depicts a notion 
of protected works that is flexible and always open to judicial adaptations, with no 
guideline — either contextual or teleological — which could decrease the uncertainty 
surrounding the definition and its potential future development.’332 Indeed, insofar as the 
aim of the Court with respect to the senses was to set the standard of perfect objectivity 
for their evaluation, the judgment left quite many questions ambiguous and open for great 
discretion in national courts. What appears as the most authoritative source of objectivity 
is technology. The translation and transformation of irrational experience requires only 
just some improvement of technique: the analysis and transformation of this experience 
pass through science, and so it becomes the essential instrument of the relationship 
                                                 
330 Teittinen (2014), p.157. 
331 See e.g., Ruth Hoy – Ella Castle, CJEU puts a stop to the spread of copyright works: the taste of a food 
product cannot be classified as a work, Entertainment Law Review 30(2) 2019 p.69-71. 
332 Sganga (2019), p.420. 
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between rationality and sub-conscious.333 Technology appears to provide an objective 
and transparent look into the part of experience that escapes rationalization. By this act, 
the sub-conscious can enter into the field of rationalization. Previously the instrumental 
nature of technology was brought up. However, now it would appear that technology 
stops being an instrument and instead becomes an aim: sole provider of rationalized view 
into sub-conscious. This way human experience becomes mediated by technology. 
Secondly, if we, in accordance with the personality theories, view the copyright as 
the project of individual freedom and creativity, we can point out that rational choice 
appears to confirm the central position in humanity, but at the same time it also poses the 
greatest threat to it. It is exactly rational logic that machines are very good at too: it is 
what we have hoped to teach them. Whereas senses were seen as something to be 
excluded, the rationality of technology was welcomed. And yet, in the light of the cases 
discussed here, it would seem that ‘otherness’ of machines (automation/instrumentality) 
is something contrary to ‘creativity’, which is fundamentally associated with humans. 
Should Levola Hengelo be understood in a way that maybe these elements of ‘otherness’ 
are not that alien to us after all? That all along, in all these cases, this is what has been 
developing: there is no ‘otherness’ in machines but with machines we share the common 
ground. The ‘otherness’ discussed in these cases is not so much the animal side of the 
human that we fear but the ‘otherness’ of machine which we find within ourselves, as the 
cases discussed here would seem to imply. Perhaps we need to reconstruct the image of 
an author-genius over and over again to hide the fact that we are closer to machines than 
that image of humanity.  
3 Final conclusions 
In this study, the differences and similarities between humans and machines have been 
chased in three sections. We started with a question of ‘what is human in the praxis of the 
CJEU’s copyright cases’. Immediately from the beginning, this question seemed to wrap 
inside of it meanings and mysteries that made it less and less clear while we advanced. 
As discussed in the beginning, in the core of humanity seemed to reside creative freedom 
and rationality: humans were able to not only choose from different options but to set the 
aim, which technology could not do. It was further questioned, whether these traditional 
                                                 
333 German A. Duarte, ”La chose maudite”. The concept of reification in George Bataille’s The Accursed 
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categories belonging to humanity had become somehow confused with the emergence of 
new technologies. In other words, had it become more difficult to separate humans from 
machines? 
This question was then approached via three distinctions that supposedly separated 
humans and machines. With the aid of these hypothetical distinctions, oppositional pairs 
were drafted. This way, we could assume that if, for example, creativity belongs to 
humanity then it must have a counterpart that belongs to machine. In the first section, this 
oppositional pair consisted of creativity and automation. If creativity is in the core of 
copyright system, then certainly automation was outside of it. In a way, this was so. In 
the first section, the CJEU did appear to separate actions it considered creative from those 
it considered mechanic. Mechanic actions could not gain copyright protection. 
Interestingly, this division appeared to be grounded on the notion of freedom of choice. 
When humans could exercise their freedom to choose from different options, they were 
considered creative. When the actions of humans were bound by rules or external 
constraints, they were mechanic. This way, the boundaries between human and machine 
did become confused. It turned out that while creativity was in some sense reserved for 
humans, automation was something that humans and machines could share. Humans 
could act mechanically as well.  
Although this kind of fluidity appeared to exist between categories of humanity and 
technology, these findings were not entirely satisfying. Addressing posthumanist thought, 
it seemed difficult to argue that boundaries of humanity and technology had become less 
clear, as the CJEU nevertheless seemed to draw a strict division between humans and 
machines. This was the starting point for the second section. While in the first section the 
division between humans and machines appeared to take place within humanity, now the 
division between humanity and technology was further examined. What kind of division 
existed there, if any? And if such division was to be found, could it be crossed? The 
conclusion was that the CJEU indeed seemed to conceptualize humanity and technology 
as separate areas, speaking of the ‘sphere of computer world’. If something was to be 
carried over from that sphere to humanity, it required an act of translation. For example, 
television signals had to be transformed into picture and sounds, into a format that humans 
could understand. This raised the question, why were those formats understandable to 
humans while others were not? The answer was then looked from the point of view of 
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meaning: for something to cross the border between human world and world of 
technology required that it could be given a meaning among humans.  
What then was the oppositional pair in this case? First, both the first section and the 
second implied the same outcome: freedom was for humans. What belonged to machines 
was enabling of something else to happen, instrumental service. This way, when the world 
of human experience was defined by freedom and meaning, the world of technology 
appeared to be defined by meaningless functionality. Like a mechanical rat in the maze, 
the machines could act to fulfil a pre-defined purpose, but setting the purpose belonged 
to humanity. However, the findings from the first section still seemed somewhat 
troubling. In some cases, humans could not set the purpose. This raised a question, is this 
seemingly strict division between humanity and machines merely an illusion, smoke and 
mirrors to safeguard the core of humanity when we know that within us there are also 
elements that do not appear human in traditional sense? 
This element of ‘otherness’ was then discussed in the third section. In a way, it had 
been developing all along but was now faced up front. The findings from previous 
sections, freedom to make choices and set the purpose for actions, seemed to lead to one 
more traditional human feature: rationality. According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, 
rational means having reason or understanding.334 It seemed this final human feature, 
emphasized in the tradition of Enlightenment, was bringing us back to the beginning. Is 
mind the primary feature of humanity? Can mind be understood like a computer? Or is 
there something that escapes this kind of rationalization after all? This time the division 
was looked from within human subject via oppositional pair of rational and sensuous.  In 
this regard, the typical division has been drawn between humans and animals and this 
division was discussed here as well. Whereas animals act out of instinct, humans act out 
of rationality.  
In the final case Levola Hengelo, it seemed that the CJEU had to separate these 
features, rational and purely sensuous, in order to exclude the irrational. This appeared as 
the final border demarcating human representation in the copyright system: humans must 
be able to make free choices, set the purpose instead of just following orders and these 
actions must take place in rationalized environment. But if the irrational represents the 
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otherness of an animal, what would then be the otherness of technology? In this regard, 
it seemed that otherness of machine was not seen as something that should be excluded 
at all: rather, technology was seen as an instrument to provide final, utterly rationalized 
look inside human subject. While taste sensations could not be defined with sufficient 
precision and objectivity with human abilities that kind of objective look into that which 
escapes rationalization could in the future be found precisely from technology. 
Whereas animals have been considered irrational, and therefore non-human, 
technology appeared as completely rational, even more so than humans. This was visible 
in the example of the beginning as well: the mechanical rat was, in its own way, utterly 
rational. Would this mean that technology does not after all represent an otherness for us 
but rather something that we welcome to be part of ourselves? Which has always been 
part of ourselves?  
Contemporary visions of dystopia include androids and technologically enhanced 
humans, robot overlords and ethical issues arising from ambiguous lines between human 
and non-human. Yet what I have observed here appears to point to the opposite direction. 
In the CJEU’s reasoning, humans and machines can act likewise, share common features. 
If we would remove all words referring to human and non-human, refuse to take these 
categories as given, it would be very difficult to say which actions belong to each. 
Humans and machines have a common ground, in humanity itself. Technology has never 
really been ‘outside’ humans. Insofar as humans and technology share all these common 
features, the final question that remains is whether this means that machines are more 
humans than we might have realized? Or would it rather mean that we are less humans 
than we would like to think? Perhaps we need these strict divisions to ease our fear that 
we are not rational, that we cannot set the purpose and that our choices are not our own. 
If humanity is indeed defined by these features, have we ever been humans to begin with? 
 
 
